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PART I: INTRODUCTION
Consider a director of a building company, who hears at a private party
about a development site that will soon be available for sale. It is an
opportunity that the building company might have exploited. Instead, the
director purchases the site through a new company, completely owned by
himself, and builds his house on it. Has he wrongfully taken an opportunity that
belonged to the company for his private benefit? Can a self-interested director
lawfully exclude the company from a transaction it could have exploited? Rules
and practices regarding the handling of directors’ personal interests in certain
business opportunities encompass an economic as well as a moral dimension.
Considering the differences in business ethics and corporate culture, it is no
surprise that there is a large disparity in these rules and practices in common
law jurisdictions versus civil law jurisdictions. But convergence may be at play.
The conflict between directors’ private interests and their obligations towards
their companies shapes directors’ duties to perform certain actions and refrain
from others. The shape and practice of such duties appear increasingly similar
across jurisdictions.
The resulting balance may still differ from one jurisdiction to another
depending on the weight accorded to the duty of loyalty of directors. One of the
most prevalent distinctions exists when comparing the differences in common
law and civil law tradition. In common law legal cultures, the duty of loyalty
has a long tradition rooted in the conception of the business corporation.
Corporations, as legal institutions, have developed in a series of innovations
from partnership and trust law. 2 In these areas, fiduciary duties are key
elements. As a corollary, the director has been primarily seen as a trustee or
fiduciary that must display absolute integrity when dealing with the
beneficiaries’ properties. 3 In contrast, in many civil law jurisdictions, the
director’s fiduciary position has not received similar emphasis. Typically,
banning a director from deriving a profit as a result from his position on the
board, whether the benefit came from self-dealing or self-exploitation of a
corporate opportunity, is not as salient as in common law jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, civil law jurisdictions have regulated self-dealing for a long time
and have started moving towards protecting corporate opportunities more
seriously.

2. See generally RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF MODERN COMPANY
LAW (1923); BISHOP CARLETON HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
ENGLAND, 1800-1867 (1936).
3. See Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44, 51 (HL).
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There are various strategies for handling ‘corporate opportunities’. A
corporate opportunity includes any option to make investments or use
information or property to potentially benefit the company. There is more than
one model to look to for inspiration. Scholars have increasingly discussed both
the US and the UK model in recent years. 4 The two approaches are strikingly
different despite both countries’ common law heritage. The US and the UK
models have different starting points. While the UK model focuses on avoiding
conflicts of interest, the US approach starts with identifying the correct owner
of the opportunity.
The development of the doctrinal and judicial conversation on business
opportunity displays an interesting geography and chronology. There are many
ways to define what counts as a corporate opportunity. 5 In the UK, since
Aberdeen 6, a large number of cases have shaped the no-conflict and no-profit
principles. Legal scholars have documented the gap between the approach
implied by these principals and the corporate opportunities doctrine and have
discussed the attraction of the latter approach. 7 Although one might think that
such considerations would be a basic necessity in the legal dialog, it is
interesting to note that it was not until late 2011 that French courts first
recognized that a director may not appropriate a corporate opportunity. 8
A demand for a change in the law often occurs when existing mechanisms
fail to provide effective governance or fail to respond to changes in the
economic or political sphere. 9 There is currently an identifiable demand for the
regulation of conflict of interests and for more ethical business practices. This
is particularly true in countries like France, where trust in institutions has been

4. See, e.g., Marco Claudio Corradi, Corporate Opportunities Doctrines Tested in the Light of the
Theory of the Firm – a European (and US) Comparative Perspective, EUR. BUS. L. REV. 755 (2016);
Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine as a Case Study,
UCLA LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 17-01, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2894577; David
Kershaw, Opportunities and Connected Assets, forthcoming in THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLOAMERICAN FIDUCIARY LAW (forthcoming 2018).
5. For the canonical treatment, see Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at
Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1006–22 (1981), (discussing various tests employed by
the courts to define what constitutes corporate opportunities).
6. Aberdeen Rly Co. v. Blaikie Bros, [1854] 1 Macq. Ap. 461 (HL).
7. See, e.g., David Kershaw, Lost in Translation: Corporate Opportunities in Comparative
Perspective, 25 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 603, 607–08 (2005); Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s Conscience
– A Justification of a Stringent Profit-stripping Rule, 28 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 763 (2008).
8. See Genevieve Helleringer, Le dirigeant à l’épreuve des opportunité d’affaires, 24 RECUEIL
DALLOZ 2 (2012). Corporate opportunities issues could in theory be framed under certain circumstances
as unfair competition cases: this was however seldom the case and there was hardly any legal
consequence for managers.
9. Such demand also increases with the development of transactions for which non-legal
mechanisms of governance were once adequate.
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shattered by various factors. 10 At the same time, there has been a development
of the corporate opportunities doctrine in recent years. For this reason, a
comparative perspective on this topic is timely. 11 Furthermore, there is no
jurisdiction in which the corporate opportunity regulation has reached an
acceptable equilibrium. Its nature and function (deterrence, prevention or
primary attribution rule) are still being discussed across jurisdictions. 12 The
core thesis of this paper shows that there is a considerable degree of
convergence in the corporate opportunity doctrine, which has radiated from the
US to Germany and France. The UK – as a jurisdiction of origin itself – has
largely retained its own, separate tradition. However, the convergence may
remain incomplete: similar rules may have different consequences.
This paper surveys the corporate opportunities doctrine in four
jurisdictions: the US, the UK, Germany, and France. Our analysis enables us to
trace the development of the doctrine, exposing the way in which certain
models of dealing with a particular issue have arisen, and how these models
have then spread. This allows us to contribute to the debate on global
convergence in corporate governance. We can distinguish two “ancestral”
models, namely the UK and US ones, which are both rooted in the common law
model of fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Regarding the regulation of
corporate opportunities, the UK model developed from the mid-19th century a
strict conception based on the figure of the fiduciary and characterized by the
no-conflict/no-profit rules. The UK legislature codified the rules in 2006 and a
procedure of ex ante authorization by the board of directors was introduced for
the first time. In the end, however, the traditional concepts remain entrenched.
The stable and strict expectations of directors distinguish the doctrine in the UK
from the doctrine in the US.
The U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine has developed through case law.
After a period of expansion over the course of the 20th century, the doctrine has
culminated in a broad conception of fairness, as shown by the most recent
important case. 13 In practice, this has led to attempts to opt out of the corporate
opportunities doctrine, either ex post – by submitting the question to the board
– or ex ante – by attempting to eliminate corporate opportunities in the
corporate charter, or by specifying what opportunities belong to the

10. See the survey of distrust towards institutions in France and how it compares to scores in
Eastern European countries: YANN ALGAN & PIERRE CAHUC, LA SOCIÉTÉ DE DÈFIANCE: COMMENT LE
MODÈLE SOCIAL FRANÇAIS S’AUTODÉTRUIT? Rue d’Ulm Publisher, 2007; see also the letter written by
the CEOs of the main accounting firms in France and published in the French newspaper Le Monde. Ce
que l’économie demande aujourd’hui à la profession réglementée du chiffre, LE MONDE, Mar. 21, 2016;
L’évolution de la comptabilité des entreprises à l’aune de celle des Etats, LE MONDE, Oct. 9, 2015
(stressing the higher standard of accountability now in place).
11. See Kershaw, supra note 9.
12. See Lionel Smith, Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations, 7 J.
EQUITY 1 (2013).
13. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
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corporation. Since corporate opportunities are of particular relevance in closely
held firms, this can be seen as a part of the larger trend to contractualize
fiduciary duty, which is particularly evident in limited liability companies. We
hypothesize that fiduciary duties may have reached a stage of retrenchment in
their life cycle. Given that open-ended standards seem to have an inherent
tendency to expand, eventually, a backlash may develop.
For the comparative analysis, however, we make the observation that the
U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine has been the inspiration for the gradual
adoption of the doctrine in Germany and France. In particular, in Germany, the
law historically prohibited officers of the corporation from engaging in
competing business activities. The statutory prohibition applied to some, but
not all, corporate opportunities and also left open some space for the corporate
opportunities doctrine to move into. It owes its adoption to a number of
academics who studied the U.S. corporate opportunities doctrine and reinterpreted a number of cases involving officers who violated their duties to
their corporations. Through the confluence of judicial and academic
developments, the US model of the corporate opportunities doctrine became
entrenched in German law.
French law, which has until very recently hesitated to say that directors owe
a duty of loyalty, has moved in a similar direction. Though the exploitation of
corporate opportunities is still hardly regulated in France and cases only deal
with gérants (managers) of small, privately held limited companies, the rules
that encompass the idea of preventing competition to the company’s activities
are emerging. The reference to the company’s line of business signals an
affinity with the US approach and a divide with the UK conception.
Overall, we can identify an export of the US model, possibly signaling
some convergence in corporate law. The convergence debate in corporate
governance revolves around to what extent corporate law and corporate
governance practices have become more similar over the years, and whether
corporate law and corporate governance have been trending towards a
shareholder-oriented model. Our paper enables us to tackle a number of
questions. First, how can convergence take place on the micro-level of specific
legal doctrines? Second, why are systems converging to a particular model
(here, apparently the US one)? And third, is convergence complete or
incomplete? In a well-known paper, Gilson distinguished between formal and
functional convergence. 14 Our analysis suggests a complex picture. We can see
relatively complete formal convergence in Germany toward the US model, but
only a limited level of it in France, where the doctrine has largely been
absorbed sub rosa.

14. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001).
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This article proceeds as follows. Part II sets up the question we are trying to
answer in this paper: are jurisdictions converging to a single model of the
corporate opportunity doctrine? To that end, we look at the meaning of
convergence, the process, and both of its formal and functional content. We
therefore have to explore the economic role of the corporate opportunities
doctrine within the framework of agreements underlying a specific corporation,
as well as the larger environment in which corporations operate. We also have
to confront the question of legal transplants: when a rule or legal principle
transplants from one system to the other, how will the host system react? Part
III begins the comparative investigation by looking at the two “origin”
countries that developed the corporate opportunity doctrine by themselves,
namely the UK and the US. As we show, the doctrine in those two jurisdictions
shares some common features, but ultimately, they rest on very different
principles. Part IV provides two case studies in legal transplantation: while the
corporate opportunities doctrine is of common law origin, both Germany and
France have adopted it in recent years. As we show, both countries have
adopted a model that resembles the US model more closely than the UK model.
Part V attempts to explain the success of the US model compared to the UK
model by framing the debate within the context of convergence in corporate
governance. Part VI discusses the implication for legal theory, specifically the
convergence debate in corporate governance and the transplant debate in
comparative law. Part VII summarizes and concludes our findings.
PART II: LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AS A VEHICLE FOR CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

The concept of business opportunities and the necessity to subject them to
some kind of judicial scrutiny is more recent in Germany and in France than in
the UK and in the US, where the doctrines’ outlines started to take shape in the
late 19th century. This raises several questions: 1) why in both common law and
civil law jurisdictions, corporate law doctrines often come to resemble each
other over time, and 2) how deep this resemblance actually is. 15 Additionally,
this development triggers the question of whether the law protecting corporate
opportunities is converging. In this part, we survey the phenomenon of
convergence in corporate governance and situate the doctrinal concept of
corporate opportunities as a legal transplant within this debate. Subsection A
discusses convergence in corporate governance generally and distinguishes
between formal and functional convergence. Subsection B argues that the
corporate opportunity doctrine constitutes a legal transplant as understood by
the comparative law literature. To better understand the role such a legal

15. See generally David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL
CULTURES 7, 22 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
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transplant can take up in the host jurisdiction, subsection C investigates the
economic functions of corporate opportunities, particularly from the standpoint
of incomplete contacts theory.
A. Convergence in corporate governance – phenomenon or phantom?
The convergence debate in corporate governance typically attempts to
describe a development that reached its highest point during the late 1990s and
early 2000s. In short, in the view of the convergence theory, a corporate
governance model focused on the interest of shareholders, in particular outside
investors, radiated from the U.S. and the U.K., began to influence both the
corporate governance practices and the corporate laws of countries where
previously, other interests dominated. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the rise of
the “corporate governance movement” around Europe resulted in the enactment
of corporate governance codes based on the British “comply or explain”
model. 16 Corporate law reforms of this period, such as the German Control and
Transparency Act of 1998, 17 the French “Nouvelles régulations économiques”
of 2001 18, and the Italian reforms of 2004, were ostensibly intended to appeal
to the interests of shareholders. 19 Both the EU’s “High-Level Report of

16. Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance, 17 CORP. GOV. 376,
377–79 (2009) (describing the spread of codes from their English origins). The ECGI provides a list at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php. Since a 2006 amendment, art. 46a of the Fourth EC Company
Law Directive (the “Accounting Directive”) requires that publicly traded firms must disclose whether
the company applies a corporate governance code, and explain if it does not apply some of its
provisions. The significance of these codes in Continental Europe is questionable, given that there is
little, if any empirical evidence showing positive effects. For alternative interpretations, see Steen
Thomsen, The Hidden Meaning of Codes: Corporate Governance and Investor Rent Seeking, 7 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 845 (2006), for interpreting codes as a rent-seeking mechanism for institutional
investors; Lutz-Christian Wolff, Law as Marketing Gimmick – The Case of the German Corporate
Governance Code, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 115, 132–33 (2004) (plausibly describing the
German code as a marketing instrument aimed at foreign investors); Alessandro Zattoni & Francesca
Cuomo, Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance? A Comparison of Institutional and Efficiency
Perspectives, 16 CORP. GOV. 1, 13 (2008) (suggesting that the content and adoption process of codes
supports both an “efficiency theory” and a “legitimation theory” for the adoption of codes in civil law
countries); MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 56–59 (2008).
17. Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich [KonTraG] [Law on Control
and Transparency in Business], Mar. 3, 1998, BGBL I at 786, no. 24 (Ger.); see, e.g., Mariana
Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2952 (2012)
(discussing the role of the KonTraG and privatization for the development of shareholder value thinking
in Germany); PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY 192 (2008).
However, the ostensible motivation of this comprehensive legal reform were actually a number of
corporate failures in the late 1990s. For an overview of the act, see Ulrich Seibert, Control and
Transparency in Business (KonTraG): Corporate Governance Reform in Germany, 1999 EUR. BUS. L.
REV. 70, 70 (describing the collapse of Metallgesellschaft as a main trigger for the debate).
18. Ben Clift, French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mechanisms of Change
and Hybridisation within Models of Capitalism, 55 POL. STUD. 546, 553–57 (2007).
19. See also Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental
Europe, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 127–37 (2007) (surveying Continental European reforms).

99

3 - GELTER (DO NOT DELETE)

Berkeley Business Law Journal

5/25/2018 8:54 PM

Vol. 15:1, 2018

Company Law Experts” of 2002 20 and the 2007 Shareholder Rights Directive
followed a shareholder agenda. 21
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman’s provocative 2001 article
constitutes the most known academic contribution to the convergence debate.
They identify not only the forces of logic and the example of the successful
model of the Anglo-Saxon countries 22 (the appeal of which has to some extent
faded since the financial crisis), but they also argue that larger macroeconomic
trends, such as greater openness toward competition and the wider diffusion of
equity ownership, play a role in this purported trend. 23 Related changes, such as
those in the structure of retirement systems, may have also played a role. 24
Additionally, the international expansion of institutional investors clearly
contributed to this trend, e.g. CalPERS, which began to promote a set of
“Global Corporate Governance Principles” in the 1990s. 25 In their view, the
history of corporate law and governance had come to an end, with the
shareholder-oriented achieving dominance. 26
Other authors contributing to the early convergence literature contested
strong convergence claims and emphasized institutional hurdles impeding
changes. For example, Curtis Milhaupt argued that there could not be an
optimal convergence in corporate governance because what is optimal will
depend on the system. 27 In the same vein, Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe
stressed that path dependence is bound to prevail over the pressure of global
competition for convergence. As a consequence, diversity will dominate in the

20. E.g., Jaap Winter, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe, Brussels, at 47 (November 4, 2002) (“In a proper
system of corporate governance, shareholders should have effective means to actively exercise influence
over the company.”).
21. Council Directive 2007/36, 2007 O.J. (L 106) 17 (EC) (on the exercise of certain rights of
shareholders in listed companies) (implementing e.g. a record date system and facilitating voting for
international investors).
22. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J.
439, 449–50 (2001).
23. Id. at 450–53.
24. See PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE
CONTROL 220–21 (2005) for a suggestion of a shift in the political preferences of workers toward
minority shareholder protection; Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder
Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 967–68 (2013); see also Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66–70 (2009) for a discussion of the retirement savings
of workers as reason for the political importance of shareholders; Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the
Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2011).
25. Thomas J. André, Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate
Governance Ideology to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 76–83 (1998) (describing CalPERS’ portfolio
and its code of principles).
26. The authors also recognize that differences may persist among countries but they do not
explain how the persistence of such differences does not weaken their general claim.
27. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VAND. L. REV. 1145, 1189–90 (1998).
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short and medium term. 28 More precisely, Roe argued that corporate
governance institutions are largely idiosyncratic in each country since they are
formed by historical and political factors that differ from one country to
another. This sets boundaries to possible developments of corporate governance
towards the most efficient solutions. Choices made by firms and states carry a
stronger influence:29 Even in the face of market pressures to adjust to a more
economically efficient corporate governance system, a pre-selected path
resulting from historical and political origins may prevent corporate
governance from adjusting to contemporaneous challenges. In practical terms,
past institutional changes have created interest groups of stakeholders who
enjoy an advantage under the system as it has developed. 30 This situation
creates high adaptation costs that are likely to impede reforms that do not
advance the interests of these groups and perpetuate existing power structures
and institutional choices. Moreover, some systems may not be well-positioned
to follow a particular development that is difficult to integrate into the existing
doctrinal framework. Our case in point, corporate opportunities, is a typical
example that relates to the question of conflicts of interest, an issue to which
not all legal cultures have been equally sensitive. Traditionally, in French
corporate law debates, there has been little concern about conflict of interest
issues within firms, besides the question of insider trading and minority
shareholder oppression. Directors’ liabilities are traditionally subsumed into the
board’s. The duties individually imposed upon directors have only been
discovered in recent cases. 31 As a result, French corporate law is not wellprepared to address the corporate opportunity problem.
Another major irritant in the original convergence literature is the
monolithic view of superior Anglo-Saxon governance that is sometimes
assumed, which tends to overemphasize the similarities while overlooking the
differences between the U.S. and the U.K. and between jurisdictions in
Continental Europe. In several areas, the U.S. and the U.K. stand at polar ends
of the regulatory spectrum, e.g. in terms of the shareholder-manager balance of

28. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance
and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 169 (1999).
29. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 646–52
(1996); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS - WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE 47, 245–80 (1994); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating
Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 580–84 (2000); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151–52 (2003).
30. Typically, a group of stakeholders may enjoy private rents or have made firm-specific
investments that would be devalued if there were radical institutional changes. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 912 (2005).
31. See Cour de cassation [Cass], Mar. 30, 2010, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL
377, note Dondero & Le Cannu, JURISCLASSEUR ENTREPRISE 2010.II.1416 A Couret (Fr.).
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powers and in the board’s duties when facing a hostile takeover. 32 In the area of
corporate opportunities, the difference is subtler but still significant. As we will
discuss below, France and Germany adopted the corporate opportunities
doctrine mainly from the U.S., although with considerable differences.
The fact that corporate law converges in form does not mean it also
converges in function, and vice versa. The distinction between ‘convergence of
form’ and ‘convergence of substance’ (or ‘of function’) was first introduced by
Gilson. 33 Convergence is only functional (but not formal) when governance
institutions are flexible enough to embrace changed circumstances while
keeping their formal characteristics. This would be the case if a jurisdiction
does not adopt rules that explicitly address corporate opportunities, but relies
on its own mechanisms (e.g. a formal prohibition for directors to compete with
the firm) to tackle what is locally a new issue. New circumstances may
sometimes lead to a change in the structure of the governance institutions. Such
institutional alterations signal formal convergence. 34 For example, this would
be the case if a jurisdiction abandoned its previous doctrinal approach to the
corporate opportunities problem and adopted the line of reasoning and
vocabulary established under U.S. law. 35 Finally, it is possible for convergence
to be merely formal, but not functional. This can happen when a jurisdiction
adopts a statute from abroad, but enforces it adequately idiosyncratically, e.g.,
uses it to tackle factual situations different from the jurisdiction of origin. On
its face, corporate law might then seem to have converged, even if effectively it
has not.
B. Convergence through legal transplants
Although the convergence literature does not often intersect with the
concept of legal transplants in the comparative law literature, legal transplants
can be vehicles of convergence in corporate governance. The adoption of a
corporate opportunity concept across very different jurisdictions can lead to
convergence of rules.
As we will see in Parts III and IV when discussing the four jurisdictions
presented, there are discussions of U.K. and U.S. law in the doctrinal literature
in France and Germany. Additionally, the vocabulary used by courts in these

32. E.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 603–11 (2010).
33. Gilson, supra note 16, at 329–57.
34. If the political context does not allow for legislative action, modifications may be embedded in
contract and provide for contractual convergence.
35. The formal legal order of many countries was borrowed, voluntarily or not, from a small group
of origin countries, including France, Germany, the US and the UK. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina
Pistor & Jean-François Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR.
ECON. REV. 165, 171, 176–79 (2003) for a table summarizing transplants’ origins in terms of legal
family.
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jurisdictions mirrors the Anglo-American terminology. France and Germany, in
their limited adoption of the corporate opportunity law, have followed the
pattern set abroad. The adoption takes the form of a “transplant”, 36 which can
be defined as “the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to
another, or from one person to another.” 37 This dynamic differs from both the
automatic global convergence of socio-economic structures advocated by
Hansmann and Kraakman 38 and the institutional dynamic identified by
Milhaupt and others.
In order to understand the implications of the legal transplant hypothesis, a
brief account of the scholarly debate on this topic is necessary. This account
will illustrate the case for the possibility of a transplant and explain how the
transplant took place and what its potential effects are. As explained later, a
crucial factor of legal transplants is their ability to adjust to the local legal
culture of their host jurisdiction.
The transplant of a legal solution gives the importing jurisdiction a model.
It therefore enables it to quickly deal with the concerned issue as compared
with the time that the exporting jurisdiction required to refine a balanced
solution. While the existence of transplants is a historical fact, 39 conditions of
their reception and their actual practical impact have been controversial. 40
According to Alan Watson’s account, 41 jurisdictions often borrow laws from

36. The medical metaphor has been used since the 1970s. Sometimes attributed to Watson, who
theorized the notion (see below), its use is anterior. See John W. Cairns, Development of Comparative
Law in Great Britain, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 131, 146, 150, 170–71
(Mathias Reimann, & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). More importantly, the term appears in various
papers at the about the same time and in different places (e.g. in France, as from 1972 Rivero discusses
how the utility of such metaphor drawn from advanced surgery, in Jean Rivero, Les phénomènes
d’imitation des modèles étrangers en droit administratif, in 2 PAGES DE DOCTRINE 459, 459 (Andre
Laubadère, André Mathiot & Jean Rivero eds., 1980).
37. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (1974).
38. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.
J. 439, 449–50 (2001).
39. For an account of legal transplants in German company law; see, e.g., Holger Fleischer, Legal
Transplants im deutschen Aktienrecht Aufsatz, , 2004 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
1129. For a French perspective across various legal areas, see generally FRANCOIS TERRE,
L’AMÉRICANISATION DU DROIT 7-267 (2001). See also Holger Fleischer, Legal Transplants in European
Company Law – The Case of Fiduciary Duties, 2 EUR. CO. FIN. L. REV. 378 (2006).
40. Savigny strongly advocated that the law of any country grows up naturally by customary usage
and without legislation. FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FÜR
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1814). This view slowed down the adoption of a civil
Code in Germany that turned out to heavily draw on Roman law. Regarding Savigny’s views, see, e.g.,
Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law
and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 343–44 (2008)
(discussing Savigny’s view that law evolved historically and his opposition to codification).
41. See id. at 639. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(1974) 21; ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY (1984); see also Alan
Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 313–14 (1978); Alan Watson,
Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1983). For a
literature review, see John Cairns, Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants, 41 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 637, 672 (2013). For an account of history and current debate.
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elsewhere that, even if they were strongly rooted in the local history, 42 are able
to operate in very different places. As the laws integrate into a specific ‘legal
culture’, 43 the way law is generally applied, obeyed and practiced in the
receiving jurisdiction will necessarily affect the practical impact of the
transplanted law. However, transplants will also affect the legal culture they
integrate. 44 We can expect a significant impact on legal reasoning, particularly
when the transplant bridges different legal traditions, such as the common law
and the civil law. A transplant shaped in a concrete and practical tradition,
possibly receptive to an economic analysis of law, will potentially introduce its
host jurisdiction to a new type of reasoning, in contrast to its traditionally
abstract and category-based analyses. 45 To capture the evolutionary dynamic
triggered by this phenomenon, scholars have coined competing sets of
vocabulary, in particular, “legal irritants” 46 and “legal formants”, 47 which
capture the social, economic, political and doctrinal dimensions put into motion
by transplants. 48
The radical critique of transplants 49 is not corroborated by empirical
observation. 50 Eastern Europe’s borrowing of legal codes from Western
powers after the fall of the Berlin Wall illustrates the reality of at least one

42. The main examples Watson uses for his demonstration are taken from the reception of Roman
law in Western Europe. Roman rules were included in Germanic legal compilations, and these
compilations themselves tended to be adopted and adapted cross-nationally for centuries throughout
Western Europe. According to the Watsonian approach, “the interconnection between law and society is
not so close as to preclude borrowing from alien systems. Reception is both possible and explicable so
long as one recognizes that the most important group for reception of legal rules is the legal elite.”
Michael H. Hoeflich, Law, Society and Reception: The Vision of Alan Watson, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1083,
1088–89 (1987). For a (sympathetic) account of Watson’s theory, see also Gunther Teubner, Legal
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MODERN L.
REV. 11, 14–15 (1998).
43. “Legal culture” is understood here as law as culture. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 15, 193–94 (1975); VOLKMAR GESSNER, ARMIN
HOELAND & CSABA VARGA, EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURES 3–5 (1996); Martin Hesselink, The New
European Culture – Ten Years On, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 17–24 (Geneviève
Helleringer & Kai Purhagen eds., 2014). It must be noted that Watson also draws on ideas of culture, but
understood as the culture of the lawyers, whereas our conception is broader and corresponds to the usual
understanding of the expression.
44. Mathias Reimann, Droit positif et culture juridique. L’américanisation du droit européen par
réception, ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 45, 61, 63–64 (2001).
45. Reimann, supra note 46, at 70.
46. Teubner, supra note 44, at 12.
47. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP.
L. 1 (1991).
48. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974).
49. Legrand draws on epistemological premises and anthropological theory to argue that law
simply cannot be separated from its context as it only exists as interpreted and applied within an
interpretative community. Law only has a meaning in context; change the context and the law changes.
Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997);
see also Pierre Legrand, What “Legal Transplants”?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 55 (David Nelken
& Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
50. See Teubner, supra note 44, at 15.
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example of transplant.” 51 The critique effectively touches more upon the effect
of transplants and their successes rather than their existences.
Over the last forty years, this short account of the academic debate on legal
transplants clarifies an important idea for our own inquiry. A legal transplant
cannot be expected to engineer a solution fully compatible with the host
jurisdiction. It should be expected to take on a life of its own in its new host, in
the form of a legal irritant interacting with the local legal culture. Hence, the
fact that French or German solutions do not exactly follow an identified model
does not mean that they cannot result from an importation. On the contrary,
adaptation provides evidence for successful importation, as the debate on
transplant strategy shows.
C. The corporate opportunities doctrine as a legal transplant
1) The law of corporate opportunities, its function, and its interaction with
national production structures
From an economic standpoint, the protection of corporate opportunities
interplays with the structure of both finance and production. It therefore carries
a different importance in jurisdictions that have different financial and
production structures, which may be counterproductive in certain contexts.
Corporate law is typically analyzed within the framework of agency theory and
incomplete contracts. 52 Agency costs are the economic translation of conflict
of interests. 53 Fiduciary duties are protections granted to the shareholders in
compensation for the deficit of explicit promises in the corporate contract. 54
Within the agency theory framework, shareholders invest in a corporation for
the purpose of achieving a certain goal, typically understood as the
maximization of long-term profitability. Directors and officers of the
corporation, however, will rationally pursue their own goals and engage in
opportunistic behavior, specifically by activities that draw resources from the
corporation. These opportunities frequently come up due to information

51. See, e.g., Steven J. Heim, Predicting Legal Transplants: The Case of Servitudes in the Russian
Federation, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 203 (1996) (explaining why post-collapse of
the Russian Federation is an appropriate time to study legal transplants). The intense debate about the
harmonization or unification of European Private Law also steered the legal transplant conversation.
Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of the Member States, EUR. PARL., 1989 O.J.
(C 158) 400; Resolution on the Harmonisation of Certain Sectors of Private Law of the Member States,
EUR. PARL., 1994 O.J. (C 205) 518; see also Guido Alpa, European Community Resolutions and the
Codification of “Private Law,” 8 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 321, 323 (2000).
52. For a review of incomplete contracts theory in corporate law, see, for example, Luigi Zingales,
Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 118–19 (2017).
53. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 103 (1991).
54. Id. at 90 (“If contracts can be written in enough detail, there is no need for ‘fiduciary’ duties as
well.”).
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asymmetries. To keep down the cost of capital, shareholders will rationally
monitor them, while directors and officers may sometimes be in the position to
signal their good intention to those who are – in economic terms – considered
their principals. 55
In this framework, the duty of loyalty (the duty to prioritize the principal’s
interests over the agent’s own) is a mechanism that either incentivizes
fiduciaries to reveal information ex ante, for example by creating incentives to
inform shareholders about potentially opportunistic transactions, 56 or deters
fiduciaries’ opportunistic behavior by imposing penalties in the form of
damages and/or the disgorgement of ex post profits. However, in the context of
corporate opportunities, the question is subtler. The duty of loyalty always
protects the corporation (and its shareholders) relative to a certain baseline. In
the case of self-dealing transactions, this is a relatively straightforward
assumption that directors and officers will not siphon any corporate resources
out of the corporation through transactions they enter into with the company.
For the corporate opportunities doctrine, the baseline is that they will not, to the
detriment of the company, appropriate any profitable business opportunities to
themselves. 57 The difficulty here is how to determine ex ante which
opportunities the corporation has a right of first refusal, meaning that directors
or officers may only take the opportunity if the corporation forebears this right.
Following the Coase Theorem, one could imagine the parties bargaining for the
optimal allocation of corporate opportunities between the corporation and its
managers. 58 In practice, we often do not always observe such bargaining, and
courts might even make it impossible by considering its own assignment of
corporate opportunities among the parties mandatory law. Under these
circumstances, it is plausible for scholars to argue that the courts should aim at
protecting the legitimate expectations of shareholders. 59 To that end, courts first

55. See generally John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and
Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 29, 29–30 (Reinier Kraakman, John Armour,
Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mariana
Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe & Edward Rock, 3rd ed. 2017).
56. One example would be the consequences of approval of transactions either by fully informed
disinterested directors or by a fully informed majority of the disinterested minority shareholders, in
which case courts will apply a standard more favorable to the fiduciaries if the transactions is challenged
in court.
57. E.g., Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW,
145, 145.
58. Corradi, supra note 6, at 768–69. For the Coase Theorem, see generally R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (original article developing the economic theory);
David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in 1 PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 270
(1998); Francesco Parisi, Coase theorem and transaction cost economics in the law, in THE ELGAR
COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7, 10–28 (Jürgen G. Backhaus ed., 1999) (both explaining the
significance of the theorem).
59. See Brudney & Clark, supra note 7, at 1010–12 (discussing rational expectations of
shareholders as a test for corporate opportunities in close corporation).
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have to determine the expectations, which are not obvious in the business
opportunity context. 60
Absent an explicit contractual stipulation 61, a court, facing the question of
delineating whether an opportunity should be reserved for the corporation,
might ask what the parties would have agreed on if they had thought about a
specific business opportunity ex ante and had completed their contractual
relationship accordingly. The corporate opportunities doctrine could be seen as
a default assignment of property rights. 62 If the corporation, its shareholders
(and other constituencies potentially benefiting from the opportunity), and its
directors and officers were able to foresee all possible future states of the
world, they would agree to assign each opportunity in each possible state to the
highest value user (which could be either the firm or someone else), thereby
maximizing the total payoff from exploiting the opportunity. 63 This contrast is
incomplete, since it is not possible for the parties to foresee all eventualities
that may arise and provide for themselves. Moreover, even ex ante, one party is
likely to have superior information. This could result in opportunism in the
negotiation and the preclusion of a mutually beneficial complete contingent
contract. 64 Much of the literature seems to consider it the paramount goal for
the highest value user (or the lowest cost user) to exploit the opportunity.
Brudney and Clark, for example, recommend a “higher value” defense even for
the controlling shareholder of publicly held corporations, 65 where they
normally would consider a strong protection of dispersed outside investors to
be determinative. 66
The corporate opportunity doctrine fulfills an important function in
assigning potential business opportunities, both within the corporation and to
the free-wheeling “morals of the marketplace,” where they are available for the
taking. 67 Since there is no natural default assignment of ownership, this task
may be difficult. In fact, the delineation developed by the courts may rather
shape the expectations of the party rather than vice versa. There are competing
ways to analyze the issue. It might be conceptualized in terms of ownership or

60. But see our discussion below of incentives for business innovation, which might inform criteria
applied by the court. Infra section V.A.
61. See infra Section III.A.2 (discussing DGCL 122(17)).
62. Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate
Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L. J. 277, 280 (1998).
63. Id. at 322–25.
64. Id. at 327.
65. Brudney & Clark, supra note 7, at 1055–60 (discussing the assignment of corporate
opportunities between parent and subsidiary firm).
66. Id. at 1001–06 (suggesting that a categorical prohibition should generally apply in publicly
traded firms).
67. Unless those potentially “grabbing” the opportunity are subject to further limitations, e.g. a
contractual or legal duty not to compete, as are e.g. members of the executive board in German stock
corporations.
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in terms of loyalty and status of the director. As we shall see, the U.S. and U.K.
corporate opportunity laws sharply diverge on this. The former follows an
ownership approach while the latter largely follows a status approach. Both
approaches formally rely on fiduciary duties, a tool that is flexible enough to
adjust to the different lines of reasoning. 68
The remedies with which corporate opportunities are protected also play an
important role. If the remedy is merely a liability to the corporation for the
injury inflicted on it (a classical liability rule), a fiduciary who is able to exploit
it at lower cost and higher gain can take it with relatively ease and make a
profit. This results in an efficient assignment of the opportunity. However,
opportunities are often protected by gain-based sanctions, 69 effectively
assigning them as property rights (in the sense of the Calabresi-Melamed
framework 70) to the corporation. 71 A fiduciary will thus be forced to reveal
information he possesses about a business opportunity in order to negotiate an
opt-out. 72 If he is indeed the higher value user that wants to take the
opportunity himself, he may face opportunistic bargaining on behalf of the
corporation, which could eviscerate the gain and even make it sometimes even
unfeasible for the opportunity to be exploited at all in a high-transaction cost
environment. 73 On the one hand, weak protection of corporate opportunities, or
“elasticity” in their legal protection, 74 may foster innovation by permitting
fiduciaries to take innovations with them and employ them for their highest
value use. 75 A widely-cast net in the definition of opportunities and strong
property rights protection may thus at times reduce innovation and prevent
desirable market entry ex post when an opportunity arises. Ex ante, fiduciaries
may also be deterred from seeking out new business opportunities, thus
reducing the overall vitality of the economy. 76

68. “Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that investors and managers would
have reached if they could have bargained (and enforced their agreement) at no cost.” EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 55, at 92.
69. We will explore this below.
70. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1989 (1972).
71. On the application of the Calabresi-Melamed framework, see Michael J. Whincop, Painting the
Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law, 19 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 20, 35
(1999).
72. On penalty default rules, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989).
73. On high and low transaction cost environments see Kershaw, supra note 9, at 617–18
74. Compare in the financial context an account of ‘law’s elasticity,’ i.e., “the probability that ex
ante legal commitments will be relaxed or suspended in the future,” Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of
Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 320 (2013).
75. See Corradi, supra note 6, at 776–78 (discussing innovation as “information-specific
investment”).
76. For the comparable case of non-compete clauses, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not to
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575–629 (1999).
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2) The reception of the law of corporate opportunities as a legal transplant
The reception of a legal transplant may be measured by the degree of
enforcement of the imported rules. This criterion rests on the generally
accepted view that enforcement and effective legal institutions are important
for economic development, whereas weak legal institutions are an impediment
to future growth and development. 77 However, the content of the transplant or
the context of transplantation is debatable. Scholars have granted considerable
weight to the content of the transplant, i.e. to the substantive law of the
exporting jurisdiction. “Countries of origin” or “origins” have famously been
advocated for as key predictors of the quality of a transplant. 78 The policy
implication is that at the time of transplant, choosing the best possible rule will
enhance economic development. Though differences among legal families of
origins (Common Law, French, German and Scandinavian families) are widely
accepted, it remains disputed whether the Common Law, and U.S. law in
particular, carries a premium. 79 In a less controversial manner, for the purpose
of our study, the implication of this line of research is that the choice for the
transplant between the U.S. and the U.K. models of corporate governance law
bears consequences.
Other researchers have established that the context, i.e., how the legal order
is transplanted, is more important than the choice of the law of a particular
legal family. 80 For the transplanted law to be effective, it must be meaningful in
its context of application. Otherwise, citizens have no incentive to use it and
require effective legal institutions for enforcement. In the longer term, the
transplanted law must also be amenable to evolutions and improvements, which
may require the host jurisdiction to embrace the more concrete and
contextualized reasoning an Anglo-American transplant displays as compared
to the civil law traditions. In other words, the existing legal infrastructure must
complement the transplant in order to absorb it in the legal system. 81

77. Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, at 1752–57 (2000); Simon Johnson, Daniel
Kaufmann & Andrei Shleifer, The Unofficial Economy in Transition, 2 BROOKINGS PAPS. ON ECON.
ACT. 159, 161 (1997).
78. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
79. Compare Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON.
430, 462 (2008) (finding that common law countries have more robust anti-self–dealing laws than
French legal origin countries in particular), with Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock
Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 462, 495–502 (2006) (suggesting that the less deep stock markets in
Continental Europe are better explained by economic collapse in the first half of the 20th Century).
80. Berkowitz et al., supra note 37, at 174–81.
81. Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s
Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 891 (2003) (discussing “microfit”).
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The importance granted to the local context in this line of research draws
attention to the risk of “transplant shocks”. They relate to the possibility that a
legal rule that works well in one jurisdiction will not have the same effect or
even be rejected in another jurisdiction where the historical, political, or
cultural background is different. 82 As to corporate opportunities, there are some
empirical evidence that psychology of the actors might be a key component of
the efficacy of the rule. Stout has suggested that, among the elements of local
context for transplant shocks, one is “local inclination toward other-regarding
behavior.” 83 Stout focuses on the rules of fiduciary duty. She demonstrates that
in practice these rules are open-ended standards that are only imperfectly and
incompletely enforced by legal sanctions. 84 U.S. corporate insiders nevertheless
exhibit a relatively high degree of compliance with fiduciary duty rules. 85
According to Stout, “we do not yet fully understand the sources of such
differences, some of the more obvious possibilities include nature (genetics),
nurture (learning), and present social context (culture, i.e., of the needs,
expectations, identities, and likely behavior of those around us). The source that
is most significant matters, because depending of the source and determinants
of altruism, the task of successfully exporting U.S. corporate law may range
from merely difficult to impossible.” 86 By itself, the adoption of formal rules of
law that resemble U.S. corporate law may not produce results similar to those
observed in U.S. corporations. In order to make sense of transplants, it will be
useful to assess the local context from a socio-economic perspective.
Gilson has suggested that corporate governance system sometimes
converge in function when they do not converge in form: If a particular
solution is not available in the legal system, or a particular encumbrance
resulting from the local system is present, legal actors might find another
workaround to reach the same functional outcome. 87 The transplant effect –
resulting from different economic structures or otherwise – may then result in
the opposite situation: While a legal system has maybe superficially absorbed
the corporate opportunities doctrine, legal actors might apply it in a mitigated
way because its effects would be too disruptive. Consequently, we would see
convergence in form, but not in function.

82. Berkowitz et al., supra note 37, at 167; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The
Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2098–99
(2001); see also Kanda & Milhaupt, id., at 891 (discussing a transplanted rule’s “macro-fit”, meaning
how well it fits into the political economy of the host country).
83. Lynn Stout, On The Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can A
Transplant Take?, UCLA School of Law Working Paper No 02-11, 3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=313679.
84. Id. at 3.
85. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1928–29 (1996) (pointing out that US corporate managers are usually convinced
that they work for the shareholders).
86. Stout, supra note 85, at 34.
87. Gilson, supra note 16, at 337–40.
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PART III: TWO ORIGINAL STYLES OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES REGULATION:
THE U.K. AND U.S. MODELS
After exploring both the process and content determinants of the
convergence observed in corporate protection in the Western world, we now
move on to the country-level analysis of its development and its transplantation
across jurisdictions. The corporate opportunities doctrine is said to have
originated in the common law. However, as this part will show, as in many
areas of corporate law, there is no single common law model. The U.S. and the
U.K. employ two different legal strategies, which we survey in subsections A
and B, respectively. The U.S. doctrine, after a century of development in the
case law, could be described as the “ownership approach,” since the main
question courts ask is whether an opportunity “belongs” to the corporation
because it is one that shareholders would typically expect the corporation to
pursue. By contrast, the UK strategy could be called the “status approach.” It is
rooted in the conflict-of-interest paradigm, which has a long tradition in U.K.
company law and is based on the underlying principle that fiduciaries should
not be allowed to put themselves in positions of conflict. This model, even if
questioned by policy-makers and courts in recent decades, was largely affirmed
in the 2006 Companies Act. 88
A. The U.S. corporate opportunities doctrine: delineating the “ownership
approach”
The U.S. approach has developed through case law over the decades and
has not been codified. 89 While the doctrine has antecedents in the 19th
century, 90 the doctrine adopted its familiar contours and solidified in the first
half of the 20th century. It eventually culminated in a broad conception of
fairness, as shown by the most recent case considered to be seminal. 91

88. That is, while the company is solvent. See Companies Act 2006, c. 2 (Eng.) §§ 170–81.
89. In the U.S., fiduciary duties are assumed to pre-exist in the background common law, and as
such they are typically left to the courts to develop. Consequently, the corporate opportunity doctrine is
not codified in Delaware corporate law, but developed over the decades before the courts. True, some
acts provide that managers or members may not take opportunities of the business entity. E.g., REV.
UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 409(b)(1)(C), (g)(1) (providing that members in a
member managed LLC and managers in a manager-managed LLC must account to the company and
hold as a trustee for it any property, profit or benefit derived from the appropriation of a LLC
opportunity). However, even in those cases, business opportunities are not legislatively defined.
90. See Kershaw, supra note 6, at 43–47.
91. Broz, 673 A.2d at 148.
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1) The development and contours of the corporate opportunities doctrine
The most famous duty of loyalty case, Meinhard v. Salmon, dealing with a
joint venture, sweepingly established that a party to a joint venture must share
an opportunity with her joint adventurer. 92 However, Meinhard did not
establish a particularly clear criterion on what opportunities are captured by this
obligation. Similarly, in the well-known 1934 corporate opportunities case of
Irving Trust, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit defended a
principle “that fiduciaries should not be permitted to assume a position in
which their individual interests might be in conflict with those of the
corporation” and, in doing so, found that the corporation’s inability to pursue
an opportunity does not provide a defense for the director taking it. 93
Today, analysts generally understand the corporate opportunities doctrine to
be more permissive. The focus is on the threshold question: Which
opportunities “belong” to the corporation? 94 Textbooks generally cite three
tests – 1) the interest or expectancy test, 2) the line-of-business test, and 3) the
fairness test. 95 These tests often, if not typically, operate in conjunction with
each other. In applying these tests, the court’s focus seems to have shifted from
more formalistic towards less formalistic definitions, thus expanding the
application of the doctrine. The oldest and most narrow “interest or expectancy
test” asks whether a corporation already has established a tentative claim to the
opportunity. 96
The most famous corporate opportunity case from Delaware, Guth v. Loft 97
is often cited for establishing the “line-of-business test”, which asks whether an
opportunity relates “to the business the corporation engages in.” 98 In Guth, the
defendant was the director and controlling shareholder of a chain of candy
stores who was approached by the controlling shareholder of the bankrupt
Pepsi Cola Corporation. The defendant was offered the majority of shares in a
new corporation to continue Pepsi’s business and the option to purchase its

92. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). According to the court, the new lease fell into
Meinhard’s reasonable expectations because it was “an extension and enlargement of the subject–matter
of the old one.” Id. at 548. However, it is not entire clear why this should be the case, given that the new
project was considerable more extensive than the original one, which had been entered into for a limited
time.
93. Irving Tr. Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d. Cir. 1934).
94. E.g. David Kershaw, supra note 9, at 608 (2005) (comparing US to UK law); In re Digex, 789
A.2d 1176, 1188 (Del. Ch. 2000) (analyzing to whom an opportunity “belongs”).
95. E.g. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 225–29 (1986).
96. See Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496 (1900) (a corporation holding 1/3 of
a stone quarry has an expectancy in purchasing the other shares); Pike’s Peak Co. v. Pfunter, 123 N.W.
19 (Mich. 1909) (a corporation having leased property has an expectancy to renew it when it is
available); Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 139 N.W. 839 (Neb. 1913) (a corporation has an expectancy
to acquire rights to divert a river upstream from its power plants).
97. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
98. E.g., CLARK, supra note 97, at 227; but see FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 384–
85 (2d ed., 2010) (questioning the accuracy of the predominant characterization of the case).
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recipe. The Supreme Court of Delaware found that the corporation that the
defendant was a director for “had no interest or expectancy in the Pepsi-Cola
opportunity, 99 but it was (maybe somewhat questionably) within its line of
business, given its “reasonable needs and aspirations for expansion.” 100
A general reading of the case concludes that the perceived line of business
was a major factor in determining whether corporate opportunity existed. The
court also looked at whether the opportunity came to the fiduciary in his
official or individual capacity, and whether the corporation was financially
capable of taking it. 101 The court addressed the fact that the person who had
approached the director had probably expected the firm – and not the director –
to take the opportunity, and that Guth controlled the corporation, thus
compromising the other directors’ abilities to independently assess the
situation. Thus, a good argument can be made that the case should be seen as
an example of a broader “fairness test”, 102 where the line of business is just one
major factor alongside the origin of the information and its relationship to the
corporate functions of the executive.
We can see a progression in the case law that revolves – with respect to all
of these tests – around the question of rational expectations, 103 which are the
opportunities a (minority) shareholder in the corporation can expect the
company to take. The doctrine starts out with a narrow test based on an existing
interest or right in the earliest cases, but then swiftly expands to a broader test
in Guth. While the Delaware court employed a relatively expansive and
malleable definition of what constitutes a corporate opportunity, and continued
to use language indicating an “uncompromising rigidity” of the duty, it created
a “way out” for directors to give them an argument that some opportunities are
not inherently tied to the corporation.
The emphasis on rational expectations can be seen also in the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance, in which there are two possibilities of an
opportunity to be considered “corporate.” First, a corporate opportunity exists
when a director or executive became aware of the opportunity in connection
with the performance of his functions and was expected to offer the opportunity
to the corporation, or he became aware of the opportunity through use of
corporate information and should reasonably have believed it to be of interest
to the corporation. Second, an opportunity is corporate when the senior
executive knew that it would be closely related to a business of the
corporation. 104 Even if these tests rest in part on the reasonable belief or

99. Guth, 5 A.2d. at 514.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 511.
102. GEVURTZ, supra note 100, at 385.
103. See Brudney & Clark, supra note 7, at 1010.
104. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05(b) (1994).
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knowledge of the executive, the decisive question is always whether the
corporation could reasonably have been expected to take it in the future.
Recently, the most frequently discussed case is Broz, 105 which largely
follows Guth in its delineation of what qualifies as a corporate opportunity.
Summarizing the test developed by the Delaware courts in Guth and its
progeny, the Broz court found that a director is not allowed to take an
opportunity if:
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;
(2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business;
(3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and
(4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be
placed in a position inamicable to his duties to the corporation. 106

Along with other recent case law, the Broz test rests within a “fairness”
paradigm that combines the factors of both traditional tests. 107 The court
summarized the subsequent development of the doctrine by emphasizing that
“[n]o one factor is dispositive and all factors must be taken into account insofar
as they are applicable. Cases involving a claim of usurpation of a corporate
opportunity range over a multitude of factual settings. Hard and fast rules are
not easily crafted to deal with such an array of complex situations.” 108 With this
case law, the determination of what qualifies as a corporate opportunity
doctrine is treated as an open-ended standard. 109 In other words, this is a legal
duty to which texture is only given in an ex post assessment by the courts.
Broz, as a widely discussed case restating the corporate opportunity
doctrine, is also emblematic for its erosion in practice. Within the confines of
the traditional doctrine, parties have attempted to delineate the scope within
which directors can take corporate opportunities with the consent of the board,
thus further hollowing out the doctrine. Broz illustrates practical problems
resulting from the corporate opportunities doctrine. The defendant was the
100% owner of a corporation in the cell phone business (RFBC), and served on
the board of CIS, a competitor. After learning of the opportunity to purchase a
cell phone license, he took it for RFBC and not CIS. PriCellular, which
subsequently acquired troubled CIS, sued him and argued that he should have
prioritized the interests of CIS and PriCellular as its acquiring shareholder. It is
often difficult to avoid being subject to dual loyalties, especially when there are
interlocking directorships in a particular industry, and when ownership of firms
is somewhat fluid. The conflict of interest would have even been more difficult

105. Broz, 673 A.2d at 148.
106. Id. at 155.
107. E.g., Talley, supra note 64, at 293 (noting that a small number of jurisdictions have adopted
the fairness test in the past 25 years).
108. Broz, 673 A.2d at 155.
109. E.g., Jens C. Dammann, Indeterminacy in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Comparative
Analysis, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 54, 83 (2013).
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to resolve if Broz had not been the sole owner of RFBC, but merely RFBC’s
director and CEO, and thus exposed to second set of fiduciary duties to other
RFBC shareholders.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery on its finding
that Broz had been required to present the opportunity to the CIS board, since
he had learned about the opportunity in his role at RFBC and CIS did not have
the capacity to take the opportunity. The court also further stated that
submission to the board creates an ex ante safe harbor for a fiduciary that
would otherwise be potentially faced with an uncertain ex post determination
by a court as to whether the requirements of the corporate opportunities
doctrine are met. 110 As the court explained, “presentation avoids the possibility
that an error in the fiduciary’s assessment of the situation will create future
liability for breach of fiduciary duty.” 111 While superficially reaffirming the
corporate opportunity doctrine as applied in Delaware, Broz thus points toward
a larger problem in this context – and in fiduciary law in general –the difficulty
for decision-makers in business life to plan around it.
2) Corporate opportunities and the rise of waivers
The difficulties created by the corporate opportunity doctrine were evident
in Siegman v. TriStar, 112 where the Delaware Court of Chancery dealt with,
among other things, the validity of an amendment to TriStar’s certificate, which
attempted to eliminate liability of its directors for breaches of fiduciary duty
under specified circumstances that could be construed as corporate
opportunities. While the actual issue underlying the case was a merger of
TriStar’s and Coca-Cola’s entertainment divisions and the ensuing restructuring
of corporate holdings, a number of its directors were representatives of major
shareholders, such as Coca-Cola and HBO, corporations that occasionally had
relating and competing interests with TriStar. In an amendment to the
certificate, the parties essentially attempted to define those circumstances to not
fall within the business interests of TriStar, thus creating a carve-out from the
corporate opportunities doctrine. Vice Chancellor Jacobs, however, expressed
concern that a Coca-Cola nominee director on the TriStar board could direct an
opportunity to Coca-Cola. Since DGCL § 102(b)(7) only permits the
elimination of liability in cases of breaches of the duty of care, the Vice
Chancellor refused to grant the motion to dismiss. 113
The dot-com era of the late 1990s led to an increasing number of firms with
overlapping ownership structures, which led to a push for a legislative overhaul

110.
111.
112.
113.

Broz, 673 A.2d at 157.
Id.
Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, 1989 WL 48746, reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 218 (1990).
Id. at 235–36.
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of Siegman in Delaware. 114 This eventually resulted in the enactment of a
statute in 2000. The law now permits a corporation to “[r]enounce, in its
certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors, any interest or
expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to
participate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories
of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or one or more of
its officers, directors or stockholders” (DGCL § 122(17)). The objective of the
reform was to permit “the corporation to determine in advance whether a
specified business opportunity or class or category of business opportunities is
a corporate opportunity of the corporation rather than to address such
opportunities as they arise.” 115 Other states have followed the Delaware model
in recent years and permitted corporate opportunity waivers. 116
While DGCL § 122(17) does not permit the flat-out elimination of the
corporate opportunity doctrine, the provision is part of a larger pattern that can
be traced back to the introduction of § 102(b)(7) and continued with the trend
toward the elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs and other “unincorporated”
business organizations in the 2000s. 117 Critics have denounced the watering
down of fiduciary duty in the past thirty years 118 and the contractual view of
fiduciary duty as rhetorical ploy. 119 Anecdotal evidence and the presence of

114. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1093.
115. 72 Del. Laws 619 (2000) ch. 343 (S.B. 363), section 3; see also Lawrence E. Hamermesh,
The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1780–81 (2006)
(noting that Siegman was the cause for the enactment of the statute).
116. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1101–04.
117. Under Delaware law for interpreting LLC and LP law, “maximum effect” will be given “to
the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2017) (regarding LLCs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c)
(2017) (regarding LPs). A 2004 amendment explicitly stated that “[t]o the extent . . . a member or
manager or other person has [fiduciary duties], [these] may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by
provisions in the limited liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability company
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101(c) (2017). For the amending legislation, see DEL. LAWS Ch. 275 (H.B. 411);
Larry A. DiMatteo, Policing Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 279,
279 (2009); see also Brent J. Horton, Modifying Fiduciary Duties in Delaware: Observing Ten Years of
Decisional Law, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921 (2016) (analyzing the effects of the 2004 amendment on the
case law). On the debate of whether fiduciary duties apply by default under Delaware LLC law, see
Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 222–23 (2009); LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 176 (2010); Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, 40
A.3d 839, 849–56 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, V.C. suggesting that fiduciary duties exist by default); Gatz
Properties LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218–20 (Del. 2012) (Steele, C.J. criticizing the
Court of Chancery for even raising the issue); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1104 (2017), as amended by
2013 DELAWARE LAWS CH. 74 (H.B. 126) (resolving the debate by legislating that “the rules of law and
equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties and the law merchant, shall
govern”).
118. Joshua Getzler, Understanding the Operation of Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 39, 46 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014).
119. Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, id., at
242, 244–49.
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significant amount of case law on LLCs suggest that transactional lawyers
often attempt to eliminate fiduciary duties in closely-held firms. 120 Specifically,
the corporate opportunity doctrine creates particular problems when an
individual serves on the board of multiple corporations in the same or related
industries, as seen in the Broz case. Investors increasingly attempt to put
“constituency directors” on boards to represent their interests. This is especially
evident in the venture capital industry. 121 Courts typically find that such special
interest directors have the same fiduciary duties as all other corporations. 122
With corporate opportunities conflicting between different firms, a venture
capitalist firm might find itself in a difficult position as it tries to protect its
investment in different firms. 123 The problem may even lead to a situation
where a director or venture capitalist inevitably becomes responsible for one of
two firms, namely the one that does not end up taking to the opportunity.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that corporate opportunity waivers have, in
fact, become common, presumably for good business reasons. 124 In the end, the
U.S. corporate law doctrine has proven itself sufficiently flexible to address the
concern of restraining directors from wanting to serve on multiple boards.
3) The pushback against fiduciary duty and the lifecycle of corporate law
In light of these developments, we can interpret the development of the
corporate opportunities doctrine as part of a larger trend. In corporations, it is
now possible to narrow down and specify which opportunities are protected,
while in LLCs, it has become possible to eliminate them entirely alongside the
remainder of the duty of loyalty.
The question of whether fiduciary duties should be mandatory has been the
subject to an extensive debate during the past three decades. On one side of the
debate, contractarians argue that fiduciary duties are intended to fill gaps with
hypothetical terms that parties would have agreed to had they considered the
issue and negotiated. Hence, if parties have actually negotiated terms, it is
counterproductive for the courts to impose additional costs by overriding the
parties with mandatory fiduciary principles. 125 By contrast, the traditional

120. E.g. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1609, 1617–18 (2004) (noting that practitioners attempt to limit their client’s exposure to liability
through contractual arrangements).
121. E.g. Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift not the Painted Veil! To Whom are
Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1072.
122. In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch.
July 24, 2009).
123. Terence Woolf, The Venture Capitalist’s Corporate Opportunity Problem, 2001 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 473, 489–96.
124. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1123–28.
125. E.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
537, 544–45 (1997).
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common law view considers fiduciary duty to be rooted in status and not in
contract. Fiduciary duties thus arise through the fulfillment of objective criteria
and not consent. 126 Traditionalists tend to be concerned that opting out of
fiduciary duties will open up corporations and LLCs to opportunism by the
individuals in control. 127
Larry Ribstein, a leading contractarian scholar, aptly argued that fiduciary
duties should only apply in situations akin to managers in a publicly traded
corporation, with a strong separation between powerful managers and
powerless shareholders. 128 However, the possibility for the parties to negotiate
other protections, such as the ex post judicial strategy of fiduciary duty, may
not always be the most cost-effective, especially when compared to the
hypothetical bargain of the parties. 129 Critics of contractarians have decried the
economics-inspired watering down of fiduciary duty in the past thirty years 130
and criticized the contractual view of fiduciary duty as rhetorical ploy. 131 At a
minimum, anecdotal evidence and the presence of significant amounts of case
law on LLCs suggest that transactional lawyers often attempt to eliminate
fiduciary duties in closely-held firms. 132
In the end, the corporate opportunities doctrine may have reached a stage of
development where its costs often exceed its benefits, thus creating incentives
for parties to opt out. This may be the reason why U.S. courts and legislatures
have shifted away from a strict enforcement over time and broadened the
possibilities to escape its grasp, both ex ante and ex post. As we will see next,
U.S. law is distinct from the other jurisdictions in this respect.
B. The UK’s conflict avoidance doctrine: an ambiguous “status approach”
In the UK, corporate opportunity law has been ambiguous since its
inception. A large number of cases have shaped twin applicable principles – the
“no-conflict” and the “no-profit” principles – without clarifying their respective
domains. 133 The 2006 codification foregrounded the no-conflict rationale but

126. E.g., James Edelman, Common Callings, Implied Terms, and Lessons for Fiduciary Duties, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 21, 23–27 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014).
127. E.g., Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1609, 1611–12 (2004) (summarizing problems of opportunism).
128. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209.
129. Id. at 223.
130. Joshua Getzler, Understanding the Operation of Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 128, at 39, 46.
131. Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 128, at 242, 244–49.
132. E.g., Miller, supra note 122 at 1617–18 (noting that practitioners attempt to limit their client’s
exposure to liability through contractual arrangements).
133. See, e.g., Kershaw, supra note 96, at 607–08; Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s
Conscience – A Justification of a Stringent Profit-stripping Rule, 28 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 763–81 (2008).
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did not clarify the boundaries of the prohibited conflicts. The level of
contractual flexibility to restrict fiduciary duties in corporate opportunities law
remains quite limited. 134
1) The development and contours of the conflict avoidance approach
As we have seen, U.S. corporate law has developed a pragmatic definition
of corporate opportunities, with a focus on the impact of the corporation. This
development has trended toward greater permissiveness. In contrast, UK law is
based on a codified conflict, where the basis for liability resulted from a period
of tension between two competing grounds in equity, the “no-profit” and the
“no-conflict” rule.
a) Tension between the “no-profit” and “no-conflict” rules
Since the 19th century, UK directors have been likened to agents or trustees
of the company. Therefore, directors have been subject to fiduciary duties and
equitable principles that more generally shape the corporate opportunities
problem for persons entrusted with the affairs and assets of others (be they
trustees, executors, agents, or directors). These principles are stated in cases
going back to Keech v. Sandford in 1726 135 and Bray v. Ford in 1896. 136 A
person in a fiduciary position is neither allowed to make a profit nor put
himself in a position where his interests and duties conflict. 137
First, directors are required to avoid putting themselves in a position where
their personal interest, or a duty owed to a third party, would conflict with their
duty to promote the success of the company. This no-conflict principle was
powerfully set forth in Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros, a case decided in 1854. 138
In that case, Lord Cranworth enounced that “no one, having [fiduciary] duties
to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or
even can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict,
with the interests to whom he is bound to protect.” 139 Courts have initially
based the solutions of director’s liability in business opportunities on this
rule. 140 Cook v. Deeks 141 is an early illustration of this approach. Lord

134. See Christopher M. Bruner, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K.
Business Entities, forthcoming in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW [13] (Andrew Gold & D.
Gordon Smith eds., 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028798.
135. Keech v. Sandford [1726] 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (CA).
136. Bray v. Ford [1896] 44 AC (HL).
137. See Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty, 84 L.Q. REV. 472,
472–74 (1968).
138. Aberdeen, 1 Macq. Ap. at 461.
139. Id. at 471.
140. Solutions for self-dealing problems were also historically based on this rule. See Paul Davies
& Sarah Worthington, GOWER & DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW ¶¶ 16–53, 54 (10th
ed. 2016).
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Buckmaster stated that “men who assume the complete control of a company’s
business must remember that they are not at liberty to sacrifice the interests
which they are bound to protect, and, while ostensibly acting for the company,
divert in their own favor business which should properly belong to the
company they represent.” 142 In other words, an opportunity must be reserved to
the company if exploiting it would create a conflict between the director’s
interest to benefit from a profitable opportunity and the duty of good faith or
fidelity (also known as the “duty to promote the success of the company”).
Later, in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 143 the no-profit rule governed
the liability of directors. Here, a director must not make a profit out of property
acquired by reason of his relationship to the company of which he is a
fiduciary. In the case, directors had planned to add to their existing movietheater business by leasing two other cinemas through a subsidiary. They
assessed that the company could not afford to capitalize the subsidiary as
requested by the lessor and decided to enter the capital of the subsidiary and
increase it themselves. When the directors sold the shares of the parent and the
subsidiary to a third party as a single business, they made a profit as
shareholders of the subsidiary. The company shareholders sued the directors for
a breach of duty and succeeded – although the actual victims were the outside
shareholders of the company with no standing. The court found the defendant
liable based on the principle of equity that “those, who by use of a fiduciary
position make a profit, [are] liable to account for that profit.” 144
Historically, the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule are two principles
that are universal to the fiduciary doctrine of loyalty. 145 They have provided
twin lines of authority in delineating corporate opportunities law. Strictly
speaking, the conditions under which each rule is violated are specific.
Violation of the no-profit rule only occurs when the director uses his fiduciary
position to exploit the opportunity. Violation of the no-conflict rule occurs

141. Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 AC (PC) 554. In this case, three out of the four equal shareholders,
who were also directors, diverted an opportunity to a new company in which only these three
shareholders/directors were involved. The three of them agreed thereafter to pass a resolution at a
shareholders meeting of the four-person company in order to confirm that the latter company had no
interest in the opportunity.
142. Id. at 563.
143. Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, [159] (HL).
144. Id. at 144.
145. ANDREW STAFFORD & STUART RITCHIE, FIDUCIARY DUTIES: DIRECTORS AND EMPLOYEES
32 (2d ed. 2015). Both rules have characterized the duty of loyalty. For instance, see Lord Herschell’s
statement in Bray v. Ford, supra note 138: “It is an inflexible rule of the court of equity that a person in
a fiduciary position, such as the plaintiff’s, is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make
a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not
appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as
based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of
the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus
prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down
this positive rule.”
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when the director’s personal exploitation of the profitable opportunity is
incompatible with his duty of loyally promote the success of the company.
However, the discussion in Lord Hodson’s judgment and Lord Upjohn’s
dissenting opinion in the 146 House of Lords case, Boardman v. Phipps 147 shows
that boundaries between the two rules have become blurred. In some cases,
courts found liability on the basis of elements borrowed from both theories
when neither would have been an independently sufficient ground for liability.
For instance, courts have sometimes imposed liability on directors who come
across an opportunity outside the scope of their employment and did not
leverage corporate resources for the opportunity (condition for the no-profit
rule to apply not met). In a well-known case, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal even after the company’s board had previously decided (though
informally) not to acquire further opportunities of this type (which arguably
eliminate the presence of a conflict of interests). 148
There is, in any case, considerable overlap between the two lines of
authorities. No-profit cases would usually receive the same solution in a noconflict approach. This is not surprising since at a higher level of abstraction,
the goal of the no-profit rule is arguably safeguarding against the risk that the
prospect of personal profit will make the director less interested about
promoting the company’s success when assessing whether to take the
opportunity. Therefore, the reason for not allowing a director to profit from
exploiting a corporate opportunity is to avoid a conflict rather than a superficial
objection to directors making profits in connection with their office. 149 Some
even argue that the profit principle is merely a specific application of the
conflict principle, 150 though there is no doctrinal consensus on this point. 151 In
any event, the no-conflict approach has been the most common basis of the

146. See Michael Bryan, Boardman v Phipps (1967), in LANDMARK CASES IN EQUITY 581–610
(Charles Mitchell & Paul Mitchell eds., 2012).
147. Boardman v. Phipps, sub nom Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL).
148. Bhullar v. Bhullar [2003] EWCA (Civ) 424. See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142,
¶¶ 16–95.
149. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–88. A scenario in which the no profit rule
would apply and the no conflict would not operate is when a director receives an opportunity while
discharging its functions but there is no possible conflict because the opportunity presents no possible
interest of the company.
150. Lord Upjohn famously made this point in Boardman v. Phipps, supra note 149 at 123.
151. Matthew Conaglen, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NONFIDUCIARY DUTIES 114–20 (2010). The author remarks on the basis of his extensive review of the
authorities by recognizing “how difficult it is to determine whether cases were decided on the basis of
contravention of the conflict principle or of a separate profit principle.” Id. at 116. He then concludes in
a quasi-Pascalian manner that the profit principle merits to be treated separately as “if the profit
principle is a wholly contained subset of the conflict principle, one loses nothing except time by
considering it separately; whereas, if it is not, one runs the risk of reaching faulty conclusions if one
ignores it and considers only the more clearly established conflict principle.” Id. at 120.
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solution in more recent common law corporate opportunity cases such as
Bhullar v. Bhullar 152 and O’Donnell v. Shanahan. 153
b) Prominence of no-conflict rule in the 2006 codification
The Companies Act 2006 codified the director’s duties and gave
prominence to the no-conflict approach. 154 First, Section 175 is titled ‘Duty to
avoid conflicts of interest’. Second, its content puts the no-conflict rationale in
the foreground:
Section 175
(1) A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a
direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests
of the company.
(2) This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or
opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the
property, information or opportunity).
(. . .)
(4) This duty is not infringed— (a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as
likely to give rise to a conflict of interest

These provisions formally stress the no-conflict requirement. Even the final
bracket in § 175(2) could be read as a clarification to remove any incentives for
directors not to do everything they can for their companies, rather than a
reference to the no-profit rule. Therefore, the legislation reads as an invitation
to clarify and unify the doctrinal basis on which decisions on corporate
opportunities are rendered. However, it is too early to tell whether courts will
accept this invitation as they construct the statute.
In order to fully appreciate the content of the legislative reform, it is worth
noting that in its final report leading to the 2006 Companies Act, the Company
Law Review Steering Group 155 indicated a preference for an approach focused
on the “ownership” of opportunities, which is confusingly often referred to as a
“corporate opportunities” doctrine and is inspired by U.S. law. 156 It suggested
that the new codified rule should enable courts to first focus on the issue of
whether the considered opportunity belongs to the company. However, these

152. Bhullar v. Bhullar [2003] EWCA (Civ) 424.
153. In re Allied Bus. and Fin. Consultants Ltd., [2009] 1 BRIT. COMP. LAW CASES 666, sub nom
O’Donnell v. Shanahan.
154. Section 175 of the UK 2006 Companies Act provides that “[a] director of a company must
avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may
conflict, with the interests of the company” (§ 175(1)) and that “this applies in particular to the
exploitation of any property, information or opportunity” (§ 175(2)). Section 175 provides a rule that is
general for all conflicts of interest but transactions and arrangements with the company (§ 175 (3)),
which are dealt with by other statutory provisions.
155. THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, MODERN COMPANY LAW
FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY Final Report DTI Pub URN 01/942 and URN 01/943 (June 2001) 3.21–
3.27.
156. See Struan Scott, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Impossibility Arguments, 66 MOD.
L. REV. 852, 867–68 (2003).
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suggestions were not integrated in the final version of the statute, even though
the ownership issue has become Section 175’s hidden Achilles heel.
c) Construction of the no-conflict statutory requirement
The 2006 codification does not eliminate all ambiguities since the terms of
the forbidden conflicts do not appear fully spelt out. The personal interest
unquestionably consists of the benefit expected from the private exploitation of
a profitable opportunity. The duty owed to the company is not expressed, but it
is breached when directors divert some form of property from the company
(Section 175((2)). Therefore, directors have a duty to protect, including against
their own personal interest, the assets that belong to the company or should be
offered to the company first. What turns an opportunity into such an asset?
What are the contours of opportunities ownership? The statute does not provide
the criteria for these questions. Instead, guidance must be found in pre-existing
case law. Decisions refer to many different “connecting factors” including 1) if
the opportunity is part of the company’s present or potential business activities,
2) that the director came across the opportunity in the course of discharging the
duties of the office, 3) that corporate resources were used to develop the
opportunity, and 4) that the director had been employed to obtain opportunities
of that sort for the company. 157 On the basis of the framing of the issue and of
the variety of connecting factors referred to, there is a resemblance between
U.K. and U.S. cases.
The substantive solutions differ. English law tends to more strictly protect
the interests of the company and its outside investors while US law tends to
favor directors. 158 U.S. law also tries to assess whether the nature of the
interested business opportunity is such that, in fairness, its private exploitation
would even require an authorization. 159
UK courts will often define the company’s interests broadly, using an in
abstracto approach rather than considering the limits to the company’s ability
to act. As O’Donnell stressed, 160 directors are fiduciaries and are very different
from partners. “Trustees’ and directors’ fiduciary duties were not so similarly
circumscribed by the terms of a contract.” 161 The extent of the partner’s
fiduciary duties is determined by the nature of the partnership business and is
limited by the partnership agreement. 162 By contrast, the nature of the director’s

157. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–92.
158. Kershaw, supra note 96, at 622–24. Stressing the more flexible and undetermined nature of
the American model, see also David Kershaw, Does It Matter How the Law Thinks About Corporate
Opportunities?, 25 LEGAL STUD. 533, 541 (2005).
159. See above Section III.A.1.
160. In re Allied Bus. and Fin. Consultants Ltd., [2009] EWCA (Civ) 751 [824].
161. Id. at ¶ 5.
162. See Aas v. Benham, [1891] 2 Ch. 244 (CA).
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fiduciary duties is unlimited. It is analogous to a general trusteeship. Even in
circumstances in which it is unlikely that the company will want or be able to
pursue an opportunity, the opportunity is there for the company to consider and
potentially reject. The fact that an opportunity is unable to benefit the company,
for practical or legal reasons, is not a defense to a breach of fiduciary duty. 163
While this is the purpose of the no-conflict rule within the company’s scope of
business as broadly interpreted, outside that context, this solution might raise
the fiduciary rule “from pragmatic prophylaxis to something far more
draconian.” 164 In essence, the no-conflict rule aims at ensuring loyalty exists in
the corporate endeavor. Arguably, such goals implicitly require courts to
consider the scope of the endeavor. The more abstract approach observed in
Bhullar or O’Donnell artificially inflates the realm of corporate endeavor and
prevents the tangibility a possible conflict to be assessed. This uninhibited
approach raises risks for directors, forced to present very entrepreneurial
prospects to the board to approve. This also increases the chances of pure
windfall gains for the company and the shareholders.
As opposed to the way case law has evolved in the U.S., in the U.K., there
is little defense for the interested director. 165 While, in the earliest cases, the
U.S. doctrine relied upon a narrow test based on existing interests or right, it
has since expanded to a broader test based on “rational expectations” in
Guth, 166 and to an even broader assessment based on “fairness” with Broz 167
that leaves a large discretion to ex post assessment by the courts.
The UK approach reveals a policy decision: the outcome of various debates
and attempts to balance efficient transactions and conflicts of interest
theories 168 shows a preference for erring on the side of safeguarding the
director’s duty of loyalty 169 rather than giving directors the benefit of the doubt
and permitting them to engage in entrepreneurial activities, 170 as is done in the
US. Though § 175(4)(a) invites a denial of breach if the situation cannot
reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest, recent
cases such as Sharma v. Sharma 171 and Pennyfeathers Ltd. v. Pennyfeathers

163. Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL).
164. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 140, ¶¶ 16–98.
165. Knowing that in any case acting in good faith i.e. having honestly formed the view that the
company’s interest would not be harmed, is not a valid defense either. See DAVIES & WORTHINGTON,
supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–88.
166. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
167. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
168. See John H. Farrar & Susan Watson, Self-Dealing, Fair Dealing and Related Party
Transactions – History, Policy and Reform, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 495 (2011).
169. Kershaw, supra note 96, at 603.
170. John Lowry & Ron Edmunds, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The Shifting Boundaries
of the Duty and its Remedies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 515, 521 (1998).
171. Sharma v. Sharma [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1287 reported in [2014] BCC 73, 74, 84–85. It was
conceded in Sharma that the Petitioner’s conduct in acquiring dental practices for her own benefit would
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Property Co. Ltd. 172 show that common law authorities on the issue of the
scope of the directors’ duty are still referred to. If this solution is confirmed in
future cases, the 2006 Companies Act will not have altered the logic of the law
on this matter. 173 Courts will remain in a position to develop the principles of
fiduciary duty as they generally apply and to favor the integrity of the director’s
duty of loyalty over the promotion of a more entrepreneurial culture. 174
Courts recognize that the existence and scope of a duty, and therefore
whether exploitation of a particular opportunity or the withholding of
information in relation to which the director owes a duty of confidence to a
third party, depends on the specific circumstances. 175 Typically, having
multiple capacities creates potential conflicts for directors. Section 175 of the
2006 Companies Act requires that the additional capacities be disclosed and
authorized. 176 Such authorizations can be regarded as part of the factual matrix
that permits a delineation of the scope of the fiduciary duty owed to the
company. 177 This means that as a practical matter, venture-capitalists and non-

be a breach of the ‘no conflict’ rule and the ‘no profit’ rule since she was a director of a company which
owned and operated dental practices. The Court referred to the significance of the House of Lords’
decision in Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 as being two-fold: “First, it illustrates the strictness
with which the courts will enforce fiduciary duties, even where, in the absence of a breach of duty, the
beneficiary would nonetheless have been unable to take advantage of the relevant potential benefit.
Secondly, it establishes that the beneficiary’s consent does not absolve the fiduciary from liability,
unless he has disclosed all material facts.” Sharma, EWCA (Civ) 1287, at 43.
172. Pennyfeathers Ltd. v. Pennyfeathers Prop. Co. [2013] EWHC 3530 (Ch), 58–63 (referring to
Sharma, EWCA (Civ) 1287).
173. Contra Simon Witney, Corporate Opportunity Law and the Non-Executive Director, 16 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 145, 153 (2016). For recent contributions on the academic debate regarding the scope of
directors’ duty as to corporate opportunities, see David Gibbs, The Absolute Limit of Directors’
Fiduciary Liability for Conflicts of Interest: The Director’s Perspective, 36 COMP. LAW. 231 (2015);
Sarah Worthington, Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies: Addressing the Failure of Equitable
Formulae, 72(3) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 720 (2013); Shue Sing Churk, Just Abolish the No-Profit Rule, 7
INT’L CO. & COMM. L. REV. 244 (2015).
174. Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, [159] (HL) (“directors, no doubt, are not
trustees, but they occupy a fiduciary position towards the company whose board they form”).
175. Courts do recognize that the existence and scope of a duty, and therefore whether exploitation
of a particular opportunity or the withholding of information in relation to which the director owes a
duty of confidence to a third party, depends on the specific circumstances. See Witney, supra note 176,
at 184 (“in most cases, the court is likely to find that there is no duty to avoid conflicts of interest (or
indeed any other duty – including, importantly, the duty to promote the success of the company) while a
director is very clearly acting in that other (fully disclosed and accepted) capacity. Just as it is clear that
there is no duty upon a director to vote any shares that she holds in the company in accordance with her
fiduciary duties as a director, because she is acting qua shareholder, so a director who has an
acknowledged separate capacity outside the company is likely to have no duty to the company, or very
limited duties, when acting in that capacity. No exemption has been given by the company from the
duty; it is simply that the law will not impose a duty in those circumstances.”).
176. Typically, it is possible for articles of incorporation to acknowledge that directors, and nonexecutive directors in particular, have other directorships: articles sometimes permit these other roles, in
other cases, a director’s approval is required for the potential conflict that may follow. For an empirical
assessment of the content of articles in relationship with corporate opportunities, see Witney, supra note
176, at 169.
177. Id.
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executive directors are generally more well-advised to fully disclose outside
commitments and seek informed consent during their directorship.
2) Restrictions on fiduciary duties
The difference between the two jurisdictions is even more pronounced in
regard to potential restrictions on the requirements of fiduciary duties, either
via statutory provisions or liability waiver.
a) Statutory provisions
The Companies Act 1929 prohibited provisions in articles of association
that exempted directors from liability for breach of duty (the equivalent of
§122(17) of the DGCL).
Before 1929, there was no impetus to insert protective provisions in articles
regarding corporate opportunities (in contrast to provisions regarding selfdealing). The first line of cases that established the director’s liability for
corporate opportunities usurpation did not inspire provisions enabling board
approval or removing certain categories of corporate opportunities out of the
fiduciary regime altogether.
b) Ex post or ex ante authorizations
The basic equitable rule has never been a strict prohibition. A breach of
fiduciary duty can be approved ex post or ex ante by the beneficiary of the duty,
e.g., the company. Such approval blocks challenge conflicted transactions and
relieves the director of any liability. In effect, shareholders have collectively
been able to authorize the conflicted appropriation since the mid-nineteenth
century. 178 Furthermore, there was little chance that directors would have been
regarded as the company at that time as the division of powers between the
shareholders and the directors was only recognized in the early twentieth
century. 179
In practice, obtaining general meeting sanction of the conflicted transaction
creates an inconvenience, especially in larger companies, both in ex ante and ex
post situations. However, boards did not enjoy this power in the United
Kingdom until the 2006 codification. Boards did not have the power to decide
not to pursue a particular opportunity and to enable a director to pursue himself
what was, de facto, no longer a corporate opportunity. The Company Law
Review successfully recommended that disinterested members of the board
should be permitted to approve the taking of a corporate opportunity by a

178. Pursuant to the Company Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, section 90, shareholders could by
ordinary resolution instruct the directors how they should exercise their management power.
179. Such division can be altered by the shareholders via an amendment to the articles, but such
amendment requires a supermajority vote.
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director, while no other amendment of the fiduciary rules should be permitted.
At present, pursuant to the 2006 Companies Act, “[a]ny provision that purports
to exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any liability that would
otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void.” 180 Pursuant to
Section 175(4)-(6) of the 2006 Companies Act, the board can authorize the
taking of corporate opportunities, but the director in question and any other
director having an interest in the opportunity are excluded from voting. 181
How board authorizations can relax the director’s duty in practice requires a
cautious assessment. First, the board approval rule is only the default rule.
Board authorization is available in private companies, unless the articles
exclude it, and in public companies only if the articles authorize it. However, in
practice, public companies often insert board approval provisions into their
articles and investors do not oppose such provisions. Second, any authorization
that is designed to deprive the company of a valuable business opportunity or
that is not specific enough (a defect that may affect any ex ante authorization)
is likely to be invalid. 182 However, it must be noted that the board is not
required to obtain any input from a third party before taking its decision. Also,
in principle, a shareholder would not be able to challenge an approved
corporate taking on the grounds that the transaction is unfair to the company. In
contrast to U.S. law, this illustrates the weight English law grants to procedural
protections over substantive protections. All in all, board approvals are likely to
be effective. From an economic standpoint, they do facilitate bargaining over
the allocation of the opportunity to the person who, between the company and
the director, is best able to exploit it.
PART IV: GERMANY AND FRANCE AS RECIPIENTS OF THE CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITIES DOCTRINE AS A LEGAL TRANSPLANT

As we have seen, U.K. and U.S. courts presently employ a similar
analytical approach and prohibit directors from usurping opportunities that are
deemed to be “corporate” on the basis of a multi-factor balancing test. U.S. and
U.K. Courts however differ as to their general orientations, which can be
crudely portrayed as pro-management in the U.S. and pro-external investors in
the U.K. U.S. law follows a more flexible ownership-centric vision that
empowers directors to a greater extent, whereas the U.K. approach prioritizes a
more rigid loyalty requirement that comes with the fiduciary status. The broad

180. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 232(1) (Eng).
181. Id. at § 180(4). The general duties of directors, which include the duty to avoid conflicts, only
have effect “subject to any rule of law enabling the company to give authority, specifically or generally,
for anything to be done (or omitted) by the directors, or any of them, that would otherwise be a breach of
duty.”
182. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 142, ¶¶ 16–68.
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definition of corporate opportunities in English law is likely subject to the rules
of almost all situations in which outside shareholders have an interest. Also, in
cases of non-authorized exploitation of an opportunity, there is little defense in
England for the interested director, even if, in practical terms, no harm is
caused to the company. 183 Having identified these two different styles within
common law doctrine, we shall also note that the current English law of
corporate opportunities has emerged through convoluted case developments,
with some over-statements as to the prohibitions imposed on directors. The
2006 legislative intervention clarified the rules that govern corporate
opportunities. Importantly, it also granted a board the right to approve takings,
which enabled a more efficient allocation of the opportunity between the board
and the director.
We now turn to the civil law world, where France and Germany take
particularly prominent roles in due to the historic prestige and influence of their
legal systems. As we will see, the U.S. style of corporate opportunity doctrine
has largely been adopted in case law in both countries. In section A, we look at
Germany, where the adoption of the doctrine can be traced back to several
decades and the debate proceeds entirely along U.S. lines. Initially, doctrinal
convergence toward the U.S. model in the courts was only functional and likely
inadvertent. The influence of legal scholars, a characteristic feature of German
legal culture, subsequently led to formal convergence as well, turning corporate
opportunities into a widely recognized doctrinal feature of the director’s duty of
loyalty. In section B, we look at France, which has followed suit during the past
few years. The duty of loyalty is still a very new development in France, and
doctrinal convergence with respect to the corporate opportunity problem has so
far remained on the functional level, without receiving formal recognition in
case law by scholars or legislation.
A. German Geschäftschancenlehre: Common-law-style reasoning in a civil law
country?
1) Historical origins in practice and scholarship
Germany began to develop the corporate opportunity doctrine in the 1960s
and 1970s. At its foundation, we see two streams of development, namely one
in the rather intuitive reasoning by the Federal Supreme Court and one in the
academic analysis of comparative law scholars who looked at the US. By the
late 1980s, we can identify a confluence of these two streams into a single,
widely recognized, but less often used doctrine.

183.

Samet, supra note 9, at 765.
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As a matter of legislation, German law has historically blankly prohibited
members of the management board of a stock corporation from 1) operating a
commercial business, 2) engaging in business transactions in the line of
business of the corporation, and 3) being a member of the supervisory board,
manager, or personally liable partner in another firm. These activities may
compete with the corporation and need to be explicitly permitted by the
supervisory board. 184 Separate from this statutory prohibition, German law has
long recognized that directors and managers were subject to an uncodified duty
of loyalty. Managers of private limited companies, to which the statute does not
apply to, are nevertheless assumed to be subject to an analogous prohibition
because of their general duty of loyalty. 185 It is not entirely clear whether the
prohibition to compete is a specific application of the corporate opportunities
doctrine, whether corporate opportunities are a specific application of the
prohibition not to compete, or whether they are separate but overlapping
prohibitions. 186
The earliest and most frequently cited case for the corporate opportunity
doctrine dates back to 1967. 187 The plaintiff was a manager of a brewery (in the
form of a GmbH, i.e. Private Limited Company), which was expanding into a
small town and looking for real estate to purchase. In the course of the
company’s dealings with the town’s mayor, the manager bought a number of
lots for himself and re-sold them to a development company at a profit. When
shareholders subsequently dismissed him from his position, he sued, arguing
that there had not been sufficient cause to terminate his employment agreement.
The court found that there was sufficient cause, as the manager had violated his
duty of loyalty by obtaining a personal advantage as a result of his dealings for
the firm, while keeping these activities secret from his co-manager and the
supervisory board. The court stated that the corporation can expect its officers
to act only for the benefit of the business and not for their personal gain. 188 The
court did not consider it relevant that the mayor had forced the business
opportunities upon the manager or that the company had not been harmed. The
result did not rest on a specific statute and the court had not yet developed the
term “corporate opportunity” or related language at that time. The manager’s
obligation was seen as a specific manifestation of a general duty of loyalty.

184. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act] § 88, https://dejure.org/gesetze/AktG/88.html.
185. See, e.g., Klaus-Dieter Stephan & Johannes Tieves, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
GMBHG, § 35, ¶ 86 (Holger Fleischer & Wulf Goette eds., 2012).
186. Gerald Spindler in 2 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, § 88 ¶ 61 (Wulf Goette
& Mathias Habersack eds., 4th ed. 2014); CHRISTOPH KUMPAN, DER INTERESSENKONFLIKT IM
DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT 485–86 (2014).
187. BGH 8.5.1967, AG 1967, 327 (Ger.).
188. Id. at ¶ 10.
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However, the court interpreted the situation as similar to a prior case where a
manager had been bribed to enter into a contract on behalf of the company. 189
In a 1977 case, two manager-members of a GmbH (who jointly held the
majority) set up another entity to purchase some real estate that the company
needed. The company thus had to rent the land. Citing the previously discussed
case for the statement that managers must prioritize the corporation’s interest
over their own, the court found that the two members would only have been
permitted to buy the land if it was clear that the company did not need it, or the
members had collectively decided to forego the opportunity. 190 As in the
previous case, the court did not apply an explicit statute. 191 It suggested that the
managers had abused their voting rights (in approving a “discharge” resolution
concerning themselves), and remanded the case to the lower court for further
fact-finding. 192
In a 1981 case 193, one of the members of a GmbH – who controlled the firm
together with family members – was going to purchase a controlling stake in a
competing firm. The articles explicitly prohibited him from doing so, but
permitted that members could vote to waive the prohibition. Again, the court
declined to apply a statutory voting prohibition. Therefore, his family members
were allowed to vote for the waiver. However, the court found that, in general,
a vote could be considered abusive in specific cases if the corporation itself
would have been interested in making the purchase. 194 The court did not
explicitly discuss corporate opportunities, and, in contrast to the other two
cases, did not even mention the duty of loyalty. Instead, it deployed language of
the (more specific) law of corporate groups.
At about the same time as the courts were starting to deal with corporate
opportunities in substance, scholars began to pay attention to the U.S. concept
of corporate opportunities as a formal doctrine. 195 Authors began to develop a
doctrinal framework for the duty of loyalty in the German context, pointing out
that U.S. courts would have applied the corporate opportunities doctrine to the

189. Id.; see Wolfram Timm, Wettbewerbsverbot und „Geschäftschancen”-Lehre im Recht der
GmbH, 1981 GMBHR 177, 179 (using the term “Schmiergeld” – bribery – to characterize the fact
pattern).
190. BGH 10.2.1977, GmbHR 1977, 129, ¶ 13.
191. It also did not refer to § 47 GmbHG, which bars shareholders from voting when subject to
certain conflicts of interest.
192. BGH 10.2.1977, GmbHR 1977, 129, ¶ 21.
193. BGH 16.2.1981, BGHZ 80, 69.
194. For a summary, see Timm, supra note 191, at 180.
195. ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMECKER, VERWALTUNG, KONZERNGEWALT UND RECHTE DER
AKTIONÄRE 166–79 (1958); ULRICH IMMENGA, DIE PERSONALISTISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFT 156–59
(1970); see also Friedrich Kübler, Erwerbschancen und Organpflichten, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WINFRIED
WERNER 437, 438 (1984); Holger Fleischer, Legal Transplants in European Company Law – The Case
of Fiduciary Duties, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 379, 390 (2005) (both noting the importance of
these authors for the development of the doctrine in Germany).
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1968 case. 196 A number of articles in the early 1980s summarized the German
case law, issued by a Federal Supreme Court that very likely had no reason to
take any interest in U.S. doctrine, and drew a roadmap for the application of the
U.S. doctrine in Germany. 197 Thus, corporate opportunities became an
established topos in German law in the 1980s, and subsequent cases clearly
refer to the doctrine. For example, in a 1985 case involving a manager who
registered a patent for himself shortly after leaving a corporation, the court cites
some of the prior case law discussed above but uses the term Geschäftschance,
which is the German equivalent of “business opportunity.” 198 Similarly, a 1989
case applied the doctrine to the limited partner whom the general partner had
asked to negotiate a deal on behalf of the limited partnership. 199
As a new standard component of the duty of loyalty in Germany, corporate
opportunities found its way into the German Code of Corporate Governance, 200
as well as textbooks and treatises. Writing in 2003, Holger Fleischer was able
to summarize the doctrine as a prohibition, “which anciently found its way into
German corporate law through comparative preparatory work and today
belongs to the core of the duties of conduct for corporate organs.” 201 When
another case reached the Federal Supreme Court in 2012 (specifically in the
context of a partnership governed by the Civil Code), 202 the court found it selfevident that the prohibition against the appropriation of business opportunities
is derived from the managing partner’s duty of loyalty and did not require an
explicit prohibition in the partnership agreement. 203
2) The scope of corporate opportunities and the limited effect of the
doctrine
As we can see, German law has at least formally absorbed the U.S. doctrine
as a legal transplant, even if the absorption process was gradual. To some
extent, an American observer might even be tempted to say that the courts have

196. Id. at 267.
197. Timm, supra note 192; Kübler, supra note 197, at 439–40, 445–47.
198. BGH 23.9.1985, NJW 1986, 585. A decision regarding a partnership that came down the
same day uses similar terminology. BGH 23.9.1985, NJW 1986, 584.
199. BGH 8.5.1989, NJW 1989, 2687.
200.
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 4.3.1; see also GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE § 5.5.1 (regarding supervisory board members). For the application of the doctrine
to the supervisory board as a matter of law, see e.g. GÜNTER H. ROTH & HOLGER ALTMEPPEN, GMBHGESETZ § 52, ¶ 32 (7th ed. 2012); Mathias Habersack in 2 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
AKTIENGESETZ, supra note 187, § 116 ¶ 47.
201.
Holger Fleischer, Gelöste und ungelöste Probleme der gesellschaftsrechtlichen
Geschäftschancenlehre, 2003 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 985, 985.
202. BGH Dec. 12, 2012, DStR 2013, 600. It is not completely clear whether the doctrine would
apply to non-business partnerships. Between 1989 and 2012, there were only appellate court cases on
the issue: OLG Frankfurt, May 13, 1997, GmbHR 1998, 376; OLG Celle, Sept. 26, 2001, NZG 2002,
469; KG May 5, 2001, NZG 2001, 129; OLG München June 10, 2010, BeckRS 2010, 14180.
203. BGH Dec. 4, 2012, ¶ 20–21.
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adopted it by employing common law methods. As we have seen, the courts
have repeatedly refused to extend the scope of application of bright-line rules –
specifically the prohibition against directors competing with the company. 204
Instead, it superimposed the corporate opportunity doctrine as a standard
requiring judicial assessment. 205
However, the German courts have not fully adopted the range of defenses
and opt-outs that are available in the US. For example, it is not clear if
shareholders can abrogate the doctrine in the corporate charter. 206 In particular,
liability waivers do not appear to be an issue at all. As to defenses available to
directors, the sparse case law suggests a more rigid approach than in the US. In
a 1985 case, the Federal Supreme Court rejected the defense of the
corporation’s inability to take the opportunity, and even suggested that a
fiduciary might be required to raise outside capital in order to enable the firm to
take it. 207 The court also rejected the defense that a director had learned of the
opportunity in a private capacity, suggesting that the duties of care and loyalty
are indivisible. 208 A plausible policy explanation is that a director could easily
fabricate such an assertion. 209
3) The bottom line: Formal and functional convergence in the case law
catalyzed by legal scholarship
Overall, the German case study reveals several factors that are somewhat
typical of German corporate law: (1) A penchant for judicial lawmaking in the
form of standards (as opposed to rules); (2) considerable influence of
scholarship; (3) openness toward foreign influence, particularly from the US, at
an early stage when U.S. corporate law did not yet have the prestige it enjoys
today. As to the argument that German law is somewhat stricter than U.S. law
in permitting fewer defenses, 210 we may attribute it to a generally less
deferential attitude toward directors. One reason may be, as Kershaw suggests
for the parallel case of the U.K., the absence of regulatory competition in
corporate law. 211 Moreover, in line with our own explanation for the difference

204. Supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text.
205. Supra notes 187–203 and accompanying text.
206. For the discussion, see KUMPAN, supra note 187, at 505–06.
207. BGH Sept. 23, 1985, II ZR 257/84, NJW 1986, 584,
208. BGH Sept. 23, 1985, II ZR 246/85, NJW 1986, 585,
209. Holger Fleischer, Gegenwartsfragen der Geschäftschancenlehre im englischen und deutschen
Gesellschaftsrecht, in INFORMATIK – WIRTSCHAFT – RECHT. REGULIERUNG IN DER
WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG KILIAN ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 645, 656 (Jürgen
Taeger & Andreas Wiebe eds., 2005).
210. See Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Philipp Paech & Edmund Schuster, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’
DUTY AND LIABILITY PREPARED FOR THE EU COMMISSION DG MARKET 324 (2013).
211. Kershaw, supra note 96, at 610–15.
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between the U.S. and the U.K., 212 it seems possible that German law also has
remained slightly stricter as enforcement has remained weaker given that there
are fewer judicial opportunities to further refine the doctrine and mitigate its
effects.
Finally, it is possible that the effects of strong enforcement would be felt
more strongly in Germany given the differences in corporate ownership
structures. Interestingly, all of the reported German cases appear to involve
individuals with management capacity. In each, there was a strong case against
the fiduciary. It is less clear how the courts would assess a situation comparable
to Broz, where a fiduciary faced a dual loyalty due to his involvement in two
firms. In fact, given the relatively more concentrated ownership structure and
more intertwined corporate groups, conflicts of interest of the Broz type should
emerge quite frequently, even in larger firms. In fact, under the German law of
corporate groups, public companies (stock corporations) integrated into a de
facto group may be largely exempt from the corporate opportunities
doctrine. 213
In the end, we can say that Germany presents a case of both formal and
functional convergence, although with a twist to the patterns previously
identified in the literature. German courts and scholars adopted the corporate
opportunity doctrine as a legal transplant from the United States and integrated
it into German corporate law. However, as we have seen, German case law
initially developed by addressing issues that may have posed a corporate
opportunities problem without labelling the doctrine as such. We could
characterize this as functional, but not formal, convergence. In the literature,
Coffee, for example, argued that functional convergence in corporate
governance does not always necessitate formal convergence. 214 Both Gilson
and Coffee have suggested that functional convergence usually precedes formal
convergence. 215 These authors typically look at large, internationally operating
corporations that need to compete for capital and suggest merely functional
convergence as way of circumventing inefficient corporate governance

212. Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Corporate Opportunities in the US and in the UK:
How Differences in Enforcement Explain Differences in Substantive Fiduciary Duties, RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew Gold & Gordon Smith eds., 2017).
213. Under the law of corporate groups applicable to stock corporations, a de facto controlling
(corporate) shareholder may inflict disadvantages on a controlled stock corporation integrated into the
group provided that the disadvantage is compensated within the current fiscal year. Both the definition
of a “disadvantage” and the question how the corporation is compensated (i.e. through new business
opportunities within the group) leave a lot of space to interpretation. Litigation by minority shareholders
under corporate group law is rare, probably even non-existent in general. Maybe this explains why the
case law remains limited to private limited liability companies and limited partnerships.
214. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects of Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW U. L. REV. 641, 650 (1999).
215. Id. at 679–80; Gilson, supra note 16, at 336.
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arrangements. 216 Our study of the corporate opportunities doctrine shows that
similar forces may also often be at play on a micro-level of specific doctrines
affecting mainly small and medium-sized enterprises.
With functional convergence tentatively in place, formal convergence
followed for corporate opportunities in Germany. From the perspective of
comparative law theory, it is most remarkable that the method of
transplantation was ultimately a reinterpretation of existing case law by legal
scholars who were aware of American corporate law doctrines and
recommended them for German domestic needs. An important caveat is that we
do not observe convergence by legislation, which a casual observer might
maybe expect in a civil law jurisdiction (for which there are examples in
German corporate law 217). Comparativists generally ascribe a greater
significance to legal scholarship in the German legal tradition than in others. 218
Thus, it is not surprising that scholarship also provides a pathway for legal
transplants, which do not require a foothold in legislation. For a complex body
of case law such as the U.S. corporate opportunity doctrine, legislation might
not be the appropriate vehicle for an “export.” Given the role of legal
scholarship in Germany, adoption through scholarship is likely more
appropriate.
B. France: Recent adoption of the corporate opportunity doctrine by a
latecomer
1) From unfair competition to duty of loyalty and corporate opportunities
Our analysis of French law is inherently limited because there are few
relevant cases in recent decisions: the relevant ones are all analyzed below.
However, this immature jurisdiction is moving towards recognizing a
substantial duty of loyalty that the directors owe to the company and—beyond
the corporate personality—to the shareholders. Neither the Civil Code relating
to companies nor the Commercial Code expresses any general duty of loyalty
requirement for directors or officers appointed to represent the company’s
interest. Additionally, no corporate opportunities doctrine or general fiduciary
law has been developed in French case law. For a long time, only the rules of

216. See DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 26, at 176 (discussing how firms whose securities are
listed on a foreign market need to adopt foreign corporate governance standards).
217. A prominent example is the business judgment rule, which, in modified form, was initially
espoused by the Federal Supreme Court in the ARAG/Garmenbeck case in 1997. BGH Apr. 21, 1997, II
ZR 175/95, BGHZ 135, 244 (Ger.). Subsequently, the German version of the business judgment rule
was codified in § 93 AKTG in 2005. See, e.g., Gudula Deipenbrock, The “Business Judgment Rule” and
the Problem of Hindsight Bias – Observations from a German Perspective, EUR. BUS. L. REV. 197, 203–
04 (2016).
218. See generally Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light? II: Learning and Lawmaking in
Germany Today, 26 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 627 (2006).
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competition law set limits on managers to engage in private activities for profit.
Alongside their activities as agents, managers enjoyed the possibility of
developing business as principals, as long as they did not divulge corporate
secrets, recruit the companies’ employees to act for another business, or
commit other acts of unfair competition and parasitism. Only since the end of
the 1990s, managers’ private businesses have been subject to stricter scrutiny,
inaugurating a new period of development that still has not been concluded.
While competition law rules provided the conceptual framework for the first
decade, recent cases from the 2010s rely more directly in their reasoning on the
new, transplanted principle of loyalty. 219
References to the directors’ “duty of loyalty” as the cornerstone of the
courts’ reasoning signal a possible convergence of form inspired by the UK’s
duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty of the directors was first introduced as a
duty to inform shareholders in the Vilgrain case in 1996. 220 The duty was
narrowly understood as a basis for ruling against directors for hiding specific
information from individual shareholders who were in the process of selling
their shares, and who were therefore deprived of an opportunity to achieve a
better sale. More recently, the duty of loyalty of managers was understood as
the basis to limit the ability of managers to compete with the company and
appropriate business the company could do.
The first interesting case was Kopcio, 221 where employees resigned en
masse and were hired soon after by another corporation, which was founded by
the general manager of the initial company, Mr. Kopcio. The Court of cassation
stressed that he owed a “duty of loyalty” towards the initial company as a
manager. Though the court’s reasoning also referred to unfair competition with
the initial company, a majority of commentators 222 identified—as confirmed by
later cases 223—the duty of loyalty as the true basis for the decision. For a

219. On these developments, see L Godon, L’obligation de non-concurrence de l’associé et du
dirigeant de société, Rev. Sociétés 202 (2012).
220. Cass. com. Feb. 27, 1996, 94-11.241, Bull. civ. IV, No. 65 (Fr.), Recueil Dalloz 1996, p. 518,
obs. P. Malaurie, ibidem p. 342, obs. J. Hallouin, ibid. p. 591, note Jacques. Ghestin, Revue
Trimestrielle de Droit civil 1997, p. 114, obs. J. Mestre, Revue Trimestrielle de droit commercial 1999,
p. 273, obs. H. Le Nabasque, Bulletin Joly Société 1996, p. 485, note Couret.
221. Cass. com., 23 Feb. 1998, 96-12638, Bull. civ. 1998, IV, n°86, Société Pic/Kopcio: JCP 1998,
IV, n°1864, noted by Yves. Picod D. 1999, 100; Claude Champaud et Didier Danet RTD com. 1998,
612; Marie-Laure Coquelet REV. SOCIÉTÉS 1998, 546.
222. Some authors interpreted the decision as a mere reaffirmation of the solution then in force. On
the various interpretations, see Karine Grevain-Lemercier, LE DEVOIR DE LOYAUTÉ EN DROIT DES
SOCIÉTÉS, preface Hervé Le Nabasque (2013).
223. Court de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Jun. 6, 2001, Bull. civ.
IV, No. 158 (Fr.), note M. Malaurie-Vignal: “In so deciding, after finding that Mr. Taugeron, manager
of Taugeron, had breached his duty of loyalty to Graphibus by creating a competing company and that
Mr. Taugeron had caused prejudice to Graphibus by attracting towards Taugeron various customers of
Graphibus, which showed that Taugeron had acquired a clientele wrongly diverted by its manager, the
court of appeal did not draw the legal consequences of its own findings”; see also Court de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Feb. 12, 2002, Bull. civ. IV, No. 32 (Fr.); JCP E 2002,
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manager, personally engaging in an activity that competes with the activity of
the company he manages is per se contrary to the duty of loyalty and therefore
improper. 224
With the Société DL Finance v. Alibiac case in 2011, 225 the paradigm
shifted towards a broader recognition of the consequences of the duty of loyalty
in French corporate law. In that case, shareholders of a company named Clos
du Baty sued the executive manager for entering into negotiations with a client
on behalf of his own, separate company, Chantery, after the first stage of
building work had already been performed for that client by Clos du Baty. The
shareholders filed a claim on the basis of breach of loyalty and unfair
competition. The Supreme Court stated that the manager had a duty of loyalty
and fidelity towards the corporation that made it unlawful for him to negotiate
as manager of another company. This decision was the first attempt to directly
tackle the question of whether a manager can decide to take personally
advantage of a business opportunity that he heard about while in office.
The question was further considered in the Besins case, where an executive
manager appropriated a real opportunity that the shareholders (including the
executive manager) had considered a development opportunity for a
corporation they set up to manage a medical clinic. 226 Shortly before selling his
shares, Mr. Besins, a member of the managing committee of that corporation,
bought the medical clinic’s building. This occurred when Mr. Besins knew that
the other shareholders wanted to purchase the building and had given a
mandate to a professional to negotiate the sale in their name. The French Court
of Cassation 227 held that Mr. Besins’ behavior was culpable and disloyal
towards the shareholders. The Court ruled based on sections of the Commercial
Code relating to directors’ liability rather than general principles of liability
enunciated in the Civil Code, which shows the Court’s reluctance to articulate
broadly applicable solutions. The Court’s reasoning referenced the judge-

581, 3, obs. A. Viandier and J. Caussain; REV. SOCIÉTÉS 2002, 702, note Godon; D. 2003, somm. 1032,
obs. Y. Picod; DR. ET PATRIMOINE mai 2002, 94, note Didier Poracchia) Fails to fulfill its duty of loyalty
and fidelity to the company it heads “the resigning manager who starts a competing company during the
notice period imposed by a clause in the articles of association and whose competing company starts to
operate before the expiry of that period.”
224. Jean-Jacques Caussain, A propos du devoir de loyauté des dirigeants de société, in
MELANGES MERCADAL, 303, 307 (2002).
225. Court de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Nov. 15, 2011, Bull. civ.
IV, No. 10-15.049 (Fr.), note Couret and Dondero; D2012, 134, note Favario; Bull. Joly 2012, <page
21>, note Le Nabasque, DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS 2012, n°2, p. 21, note Roussille; CONTRATS
CONCURRENCE CONSOMMATION 2012, n°2, p. 39, note obs. M. Malaurie ; GAZ. PAL.2012, n° 41, p. 19,
note. Saintourens). See also Genevieve Helleringer, Le dirigeant à l’épreuve des opportunité d’affaires,
Recueil Dalloz 1560 (2012).
226. Cass. com., Dec. 18, 2012, n° 11-24.305, Bull. Civ. IV n° 1281, F-P+B, Daury vs. Besins,
D2013, 288, note Favaro; D2013, 2812, note Gomy; REV. SOCIÉTÉS 213, 362, note Massart; RTD Com
2013, 90, obs. B. Dondero & P. Le Cannu.
227. This is the French court of last resort in commercial and civil matter.
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enunciated principle that directors have a “duty of loyalty” towards the
shareholders and the corporation.
Cases continue to clarify the content of the duty of loyalty, not via careful
interpretation of a written codified rule, but by the concretization of a standard.
Consequently, there is room for divergent opinions regarding the content of the
duty of loyalty. While there is agreement on the existence of a stringent
information requirement towards the shareholders, some authors limit the duty
of loyalty to a non-compete obligation, which is only triggered under certain
factual circumstances. 228 On the other hand, others recognize that a more
extensive principle bans any behavior that may adversely affect the
company. 229 In any case, French law appears to be in the process of expanding
the duty of loyalty, With the Besins and the DL Finance decisions, the duty of
loyalty included a broader meaning for the first time: a duty of loyalty towards
the company. The language used by the Supreme Court in these cases is
interestingly both emphatic and uncertain. The Court refers in the 2011 DL
Finance decision to “a duty of loyalty and fidelity,” 230 without the courts ever
explaining the meaning of either term. Moreover, only one consequence is
drawn from the breach of both obligations, as if they formed a pair. Authors
have usually concluded that the “duty of fidelity” has no independent meaning:
it is mentioned to reinforce the solemnity of the relationship between the
manager and the company. 231 French legal vocabulary does not include
“fiduciary duties”: based on a common root, the notion of fidelity may be
understood as conveying the same idea.
In cases in which managers appropriate themselves an opportunity that
should arguably have been reserved to the company, the reasoning is very
much fact-based, which is a relatively uncommon approach in French law.
Even the French Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court in civil and
commercial matters 232 that only judges legal principles, relies heavily on
factual assessments of lower courts to reach conclusions in corporate
opportunity cases, particularly weighing the impact of directors’ behaviors on
the corporation. Such an approach is characteristic for the application of an
implicit fairness standard and matches what we have identified as the U.S.
approach in this matter. Statements by scholars, who refer to U.S. law more

228. Marc Gomy, D2017, 2445. See also Laurent Godon, L’obligation de non-concurrence de
l’associé et du dirigeant de société, at 202.
229. See Revue Trimestrielle de droit commercial 2013, 90, obs. B Dondero & P Le Cannu.
230. Such a doublet was already used in an earlier decision. Cass. com., Feb. 12, 2002, Darrès c/
Société Locam, supra note 223.
231. See L Godon, L’obligation de non-concurrence de l’associé et du dirigeant de société, Rev.
Sociétés, at 202 (2012).
232. Whereas the Court of Cassation is the Supreme Court in civil, commercial and criminal
matters, the Conseil d’Etat is the highest jurisdiction in administrative and public law, and the Conseil
Constitutionnel is the highest court in constitutional matters.
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than the tradition of their English neighbors provide further evidence
demonstrating the role of U.S. law at a substantive level. 233 The preeminence of
the less stringent U.S. approach is not surprising, since the progress of
corporate opportunity law shows an increased standard for business ethics and
an increased recognition of a fiduciary duty, which has been relatively absent in
the French business and legal culture until recently. 234 This expansion
understandably builds upon established notions in general private law (such as
property law) and immediately raises the question of the ownership of a
specific corporate opportunity.
The solutions expressed in Kopcio, DL Finance, and Besins give some
indication of the direction of the law’s development, and they provide evidence
that French law is expanding the duty of loyalty of directors and is on the verge
of embracing the concept of corporate opportunities. However, the limited
number of decided cases leaves certain important issues open. In particular, it is
unclear which opportunities are deemed to be “corporate” opportunities and, as
such, privileged. There are two criteria found in U.S. and UK law: first, the
content of the opportunity and how closely it relates to the corporation’s
activity; secondly, how the opportunity arose. 235 DL Finance does refer to
“negotiating a contract in the same domain of activity,” 236 but no guidance is
offered to interpret this criterion, which might include the existence of direct
competition. Regarding the origin of the opportunity, Besins mentions that the
opportunity came to the manager’s knowledge while in office but within a
cluster of other factual observations, without drawing specific conclusion about
this specific basis. Other aspects of French corporate law also give some
guidance, though it is incomplete. For example, opportunities that are identified
by a director while he is in office are likely to be identified as belonging to the
corporation. 237
2) Functional, but not formal convergence
Until quite recently, conflicts of interest were not a topic of concern in
French business practice and were not subject to any specific legal treatment

233. See Bruno Dondero, Le traitement juridique des conflits d’intérêts : entre droit commun et
dispositifs spéciaux, DALLOZ 1686 (2012).
234. The contract law of mandate requires a duty of loyalty from the agent. See PHILIPPE
MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS & PIERE-YVES GAUTIER, LES CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX, n°567 (5th ed., 2011).
235. See id.
236. Cass. com., Nov. 15, 2011, No. 10-15.049, F-P+B, Sté DL finances c/ A, JCP éd. E, 2011, 16,
note Couret & Dondero.
237. Cass. crim., Jan. 12, 2005, No. 04-8399: “Commits an offense of abuse of company’s assets a
non-salaried manager who deposits in his own name a Soleau envelope concerning an invention which
was the result of the design and work carried out within the company.”
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besides self-dealing. 238 Even the rules relating to related-party transactions
were not openly described as a response to potential harm created by conflicts
of interest. Such transactions have to follow an authorization procedure that
combines approval of the board (if there is one) and of the shareholders. But
this procedure only applies to agreements that the interested party declares as
being unusual or not concluded at arms’ length. 239 There are no provisions
dealing with tunneling more generally, 240 but for rules enunciating that
managers shall be liable if they commit a wrongdoing that causes harm to the
company, and for criminal sanctions for abuse of corporate assets or votes.
Liability and criminal sanctions are in practice rarely triggered (unless the
company has become insolvent), despite the possibility for investors to act ut
singuli in the name of the harmed company. 241
During the last two decades, a tendency to moralize business practices has
emerged to meet the conditions required by modern and more globalized
capitalism. Considerations about the management of conflicts of interests have
represented an aspect of this development, 242 with clear attention being paid to
corporate governance practices in other countries, 243 particularly the United
States and the United Kingdom. 244 The influence of the Anglo-American
transplant of corporate opportunities law can therefore be traced back to this
momentum.
The French case study reveals elements that are emblematic of French
corporate law: (1) formal expression of general principles after they are
uncovered by judicial lawmaking; (2) pressure toward the moralization of

238. Bruno Dondero, Le traitement juridique des conflits d’intérêts: entre droit commun et
dispositifs spéciaux, DALLOZ 1686 (2012).
239. For a critique of the efficacy of the procedure, see Genevieve Helleringer, Related Party
Transaction. The French Model, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS (Luca
Enriques & Tobias Troeger eds., forthcoming 2018).
240. There is no procedure authorizing the private taking of corporate opportunities as in codified
English company law.
241. The fact that class action procedures and contingent fee agreements for lawyers are not
available might explain for the limited number of actions.
242. The 1995 Vienot report marked the realization that foreign professional investors set pressure
for reform in the way French capitalism operated, particularly in corporate governance. See André Tunc,
Le rapport Viénot sur le conseil d’administration des sociétés cotées, vol 48, No. 3, 647–55 (1996).
Though the subject matter of the report was limited to the board of public companies, the message it
contained touched more broadly on French capitalism.
243. The report 1995 Viénot was the product of a working group set up by the two main
employers’ organizations, AFEP and CNPF (which became MEDEF in Oct. 1998), which was chaired
by Marc Viénot, then director and executive director of Société Générale Bank.
244. The U.S. Principles of Corporate Governance, the UK Cadbury report, and the Greenbury
report were used as references. See André Tunc, prec. 654–55. The Viénot report included
recommendations for a director’s behavior guidebook (charte de l’administrateur). It included a
paragraph on conflicts of interest, requiring the director to disclose them to the board and to abstain from
voting on matters relating to them. Such a guidebook was later drafted and adopted by the MEDEF and
AFEP, including the provision on conflict of interest (paragraph 17) that also recommended that
directors should abstain to enter any conflict of interest.
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business behavior; (3) recognition of foreign influence confined through a socalled “French conception” of the underlying transplant. The limited case law
leaves many questions unanswered as to what French law is in relation to
corporate opportunities. What is certain is that such a doctrine is presently in
the making. In accordance with classical French legal reasoning, the judgemade development rests on a rule coined as the “director’s duty of loyalty.”
The notion of “loyalty” was forcibly introduced into company law (and into
various other branches) 245 less than two decades ago in connection with
directors’ and managers’ duty toward shareholders. 246 It has been the Trojan
horse paving the way towards the possible recognition of fiduciary duties. Such
duties could grant the basis for the manager’s liability –and disgorgement
obligation – in case of tunneling.
Though the vocabulary “duty of loyalty” is similar to that of UK law and
suggests formal convergence, the case study showed that, in practice, judges
tend to consider the ex post situations when assessing the director’s potential
liability and specifically focus on whether the company suffered harm, which is
a condition of the manager’s liability under the general provision. This
approach relies heavily on judicial assessment after the fact. It can be compared
to the U.S. approach and its standards-based regulatory strategy. 247 From this
perspective, the convergence is essentially functional. Unlike German law,
French law is not formally converging toward the U.S. model since the courts
have not yet adopted the concept of corporate opportunities, but French law
functionally applies the duty of loyalty to equivalent situations.
PART V: SEARCHING FOR AN EXPLANATION FOR CONVERGENCE
As we have seen, the United States and the United Kingdom have
developed two different models for corporate opportunities in light of their very
different corporate legal environments. 248 Albeit in a limited manner, France
and Germany have both adopted corporate opportunities law. 249 While we
cannot generalize from these two jurisdictions to Continental Europe or the
Civil Law world generally, it is remarkable that both jurisdictions largely
follow a pattern set by the United States. 250 This leaves three questions to be
answered. First, since this is likely an example of convergence in corporate

245. E.g., in procedural law, judges are now allowed to ignore certain written rules pursuant to the
loyalty principle. See N. Fricero, La loyauté dans le procès civil, Gaz. Pal. 2012, No. 145, p. 27. In the
performance of contract, loyalty is required, including on behalf of non-professional sellers. Cass. Civ.
3, Mar. 16, 2011, No. 10-10.503, Mahoudeau c/ Galloux.
246. Vocabulary has remained uncertain: “duties” and “obligations” of loyalty may be used in case
decisions and doctrinal works.
247. Supra Section III.A.
248. Supra Part III.
249. Supra Part IV.
250. Id.
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governance, what forces have pushed these systems towards it? Typically, legal
transplants require both a good “micro-fit” in the legal infrastructure and a
good “macro-fit” in the political economy to take root. 251 What (if any)
changes in these areas precipitated the adoption of the concept of corporate
opportunities? Second, why do we seem to see a trend toward the U.S. model
and not the UK model, which seems to be more influential in other areas?
In the following sections, we first explore potential economic consequences
of corporate opportunities law. We discuss whether the doctrine provides a
good fit to the French and German corporate governance models (section A).
Then, we suggest that changes in the past decades have improved that fit
(section B). Finally, we examine why the American model was still adopted
based on the development of the French and German corporate governance
environments (section C).
From a chronological perspective, it does not appear that the adoption was
necessarily part of the “neoclassical” wave of convergence in corporate law in
the 1990s and 2000s. It appears that we can rule out this hypothesis for
Germany. The original cases have their roots in the 1960s and 1970s. Even
when they were “retconned” by scholars into the shape of the corporate
opportunities doctrine, 252 convergence in corporate governance was nowhere
near. It could potentially relate to a longstanding interest in comparative law,
specifically comparing with U.S. corporate law, which has a long tradition in
Germany. 253 However, we can probably say that the doctrine was reaffirmed
and strengthened in the more recent period of convergence, for example, in the
German Corporate Governance Code. 254 The purpose of this type of soft law 255
was largely to appeal to Anglo-Saxon institutional investors 256 because these
investors have served as a catalyst for transplanting a common law legal
concept into civil law jurisdictions.
In contrast, the local incarnation of the doctrine in France is more recent
and is in the process of being established because of considerable
dissatisfaction toward the current standard of business ethics and pressure from

251.
252.
253.

Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 83, at 891.
Kanda & Milhaupt, supra notes 187–203 and accompanying text.
E.g., JOHANNES C.D. ZAHN, WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRERTUM UND VERTRAGSETHIK IM NEUEN
AKTIENRECHT (1934) (providing an early comparison between German and US corporate law,
specifically the powers of directors and shareholders) ; see also Thilo Kuntz, German Corporate Law in
the 20th century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205,
214, 220 (Harwell Wells ed. 2018) (pointing out the attention being given the US and UK law in
German corporate law reforms during the 1920s and 1930s).
254. German Corporate Governance Code, § 4.A.1.
255. E.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative corporate governance: the state of the art and international
regulation, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 17 (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J Hopt
eds., 2013) (characterizing corporate governance codes as “soft law” as they are “not law and lack
binding force”).
256. Wolff, supra note 18, at 132–33.
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Anglo-Saxon institutional investors. 257 Here, in a context where directors are
more concerned that their behavior might be challenged and their liability
triggered, a direct influence of the U.S. model seems more plausible. 258
MEDEF and AFEP drafted and adopted a corporate ethics guidebook in 2008.
This soft law instrument that is still current includes a provision recommending
that directors abstain from entering any conflict of interest (paragraph 17).
Obviously, these instruments were inspired by the ALI’s Principles of
Corporate Governance 259 as well as the UK Cadbury and Greenbury reports. 260
A. Integration of the corporate opportunities doctrine in the German or French
corporate governance environment
As we previously discussed, 261 the corporate opportunity doctrine interacts
with how production is organized in an economic system. Therefore, it may
provide a better fit in some systems of economic organization than in others,
which could have an impact on its transplantation. Legal systems where the
doctrine creates considerable resistance would likely not be particularly
receptive to the corporate opportunities doctrine. In other words, the doctrine
would lack the necessary macro-fit for a successful legal transplant because an
adverse political economy would trigger considerable resistance. On the one
hand, this might result in outright political resistance. On the other hand, courts
often try to find solutions that are not completely at odds with current business
practice. 262 Individuals acting within a legal system that adopts a doctrine from
abroad—who are socialized in a particular mode of economic organization and
culture—might be inclined to work with a doctrine in a different way than
would their counterparts in the legal system of origin. In such a case, the reason
would be that the imposition of the unmodified doctrine would be seen as too
burdensome for important constituencies, namely business interests, in the

257. United States portfolio holdings of foreign securities account for around 12% of market
capitalization in France. Markus Roth, Labor and Corporate Governance in Times of Pension
Capitalism, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 778 (2013).
258. See Véronique Magnier, Réception du droit américain dans l’organisation interne des
sociétés commerciales, in L’américanisation du droit, supra note 40, at 213, 219–21. See also Crédit
Martiniquais, supra note 32.
259. On the ALI Principles, see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
260. See Véronique Magnier, Les conflits d’intérêts dans les Principes de corporate governance,
in LES CONFLITS D’INTERETS DANS LE MONDE DES AFFAIRES, UN JANUS A COMBATTRE? 139–54
(Véronique Magnier ed., 2006).
261. Supra Section II.C.1.
262. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 30, at 156 (suggesting that players in a corporate
governance system have human capital investment in the currents rules and are therefore unlikely to
switch); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in Business Law and How Unifying Ends Up in
New Divergencies, 61 MODERN L. REV. 11, 27–31 (1998) (discussing how legal doctrine and business
practice have evolved side by side, which creates a hurdle for legal change); Eva Micheler, English and
German Securities Law: A Thesis in Doctrinal Path Dependence, 123 L.Q. REV. 251, 255–57 (2007)
(explaining how law will often not convergence to global norms because of its linkage with local
business practices).
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economic and legal system. 263 Hence, the doctrine is applied differently than in
the system of origin, thus resulting in a typical transplant effect.
Intuitively, one might think that the corporate opportunities doctrine should
be straightforward and uncontroversial; investors should be more likely to
invest ex ante if they are protected from fiduciary opportunism ex post.
Protection of property rights in corporate opportunities thus contributes to a
stronger base of external financial investment. 264 This seems particularly
important in firms or industries where a high level of specific investment in
information by the firm is necessary to develop business opportunities, and
strong enforcement may be necessary to preserve incentives to invest. 265
Investors would likely want to be protected from a fiduciary who is departing
the firm with innovation worth 10 years of corporate expenditures. However,
we can observe different levels of enforcement of fiduciary duties generally
between jurisdictions, and we observe corporate opportunity waivers. Thus, the
corporate opportunities doctrine must logically present a trade-off, most likely
because it prohibits certain transactions and inhibits certain business structures.
Economically speaking, the corporate opportunity doctrine protects
business innovation. 266 The firm may have researched possible business
expansion and spent time and money doing so. This may be interpreted as
“specific investment in intellectual skills that has been carried out by managers
as a team.” 267 Concurrently, some business innovation will also be carried out
by team members outside the team at their own time and expense. Ideally, the
doctrine should delineate these two cases. Of course, courts are not always able
to differentiate. UK courts tend to define the company’s interest very broadly
and also tend to strictly protect the outside investors to the detriment of the
directors. 268 Even under the flexible U.S. “fairness” standard, courts might
sometimes be over-expansive, thus discouraging individual investment in
business innovation. 269 The trade-off inherent in the doctrine lies in the
discouragement of financial investment in cases with a low level of

263. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, at 157–58; David Charny, The Politics of Corporate Governance,
in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 293, 297–303 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Mark Roe eds., 2004) (both discussing how distribution of wealth and economic power created by
existing legal rules creates entrenched interest groups that will oppose changing them).
264. Supra Section II.C.1.
265. See Corradi, supra note 6, at 776.
266. Id. at 776–78 (discussing innovation as “information-specific investment”).
267. Id. at 777.
268. See above Section III.B.
269. A parallel example might be the likely effect of covenants prohibiting workers to compete,
which arguably have been a competitive disadvantage for Route 128 (Massachusetts) relative to Silicon
Valley (California) because they made it hard for employees to transfer acquired knowledge to new
ventures. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, And Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
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enforcement, and in a discouragement of individual investment on business
innovation in cases with a high level of enforcement.
To apply this analysis to the convergence debate, we need to analyze the
impact that a strictly enforced corporate opportunity would have in different
financial systems, which are often described in the comparative corporate
governance literature. In particular, the socio-economic “varieties of
capitalism” theory suggests that different countries have developed different
packages of socioeconomic and political institutions that have helped the
respective jurisdictions become competitive by virtue of providing different
sets of institutional complementarities. While so-called market-based or liberal
capitalist systems (which include the United States and the UK) rely mainly on
individual market transactions to coordinate economic activity, coordinated
capitalist systems (which include France and Germany) operate more strongly
through coordination between aggregated interest groups, such as unions and
employer associations relying on collective bargaining. 270 Specific human
capital investment creating a stronger long-term relationship between firms and
employees is thought to be more important in the latter group, whereas the
former system is characterized by a mobile labor force. 271
A related—but not entirely identical—literature distinguishes between
“outside” or “arm’s length” financial systems and “inside” or “controloriented” financial systems. Outsider systems serve firms’ financial needs by
providing deep stock and bond markets, whereas insider systems are
characterized by bank finance and other large shareholders. 272 It is obvious to
see a connection to the longstanding debate about ownership structures, which
tends to find that publicly traded firms in the United States, and to a lesser
extent in the UK, have more dispersed share ownership than their Continental
European counterparts. 273
If we accept the veracity of these distinctions, we can see that the trade-off
inherent in the corporate opportunities doctrine will likely have different results
in different financial systems. In a dispersed ownership system such as that of
the United States, which relies mainly on external, arm’s length finance, a

270. On the distinction between “liberal” and “coordinated” market economies in the varieties of
capitalism literature, see Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 1, 8–9 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); Richard W. Carney,
CONTESTED CAPITALISM 3 (2010).
271. E.g., id. at 145–47, 154; Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Social
Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State, in VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM.
272. See generally Erik Berglöf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997); DIGNAM & GALANIS,
supra note 26, at 64.
273. E.g., Marco Becht & Alisa Roëll, Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison, 43
EUR. ECON. REV. 1049 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471–517 (1999).
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strong enforcement of the corporate opportunity doctrine will benefit outside
finance by dispersed shareholders. Dispersed shareholders at the margins will
be more likely to invest in the firm because their expectations in the use of
business opportunities are relatively unlikely to be disappointed. The cost of the
corporate opportunity doctrine is relatively small, given that their target would
primarily be managers in control of the firm. In firms with dispersed
ownership, controlling shareholders are unlikely to be significantly affected by
the doctrine through their interaction with the firm, given that they are rarely
involved with business decisions and not necessarily represented in the board
of directors. As non-controlling shareholders, they would not be subject to a
fiduciary duty.
By contrast, in relational finance systems such as that of Germany and
France, which have significant shareholders and corporate group structures, a
corporate opportunities doctrine might produce lower benefits and the higher
costs. Outside investment is less important, which means that defeating
expectations of outside shareholders is a smaller problem for firms seeking a
continued ability to attract investment in the stock market. Large shareholders,
so long as they are not controlling shareholders, will need judicial enforcement
less frequently, given that they will monitor directors through their delegates on
the board. Large shareholders may themselves engage in business innovation.
As significant investors with interlocking board members, they will more likely
be inhibited in business activities by the doctrine should it end up being
enforced. A strict judicially enforced corporate opportunity doctrine thus may
be counterproductive since it would inhibit the creation of corporate groups.
The reason is that parent corporations may themselves be considered
fiduciaries, which is why they would be subject to the corporate opportunities
doctrine and therefore potentially inhibited in their own business innovation.
For the sake of analytical clarity, we have kept our analysis purely static
and treated ownership structures and financial systems as exogenous to the
corporate opportunities doctrine. This may not entirely be true; the presence of
a corporate opportunity doctrine may, together with other factors and
enforcement of fiduciary duties in general, push firms marginally more closely
toward an outside finance system. However, causation could also be reversed; a
particular ownership structure and financial system may have an impact on the
legal doctrine, as it shapes the political economy of corporate law, and thus
adjusts the “macro-fit” of a doctrine considered a legal transplant. Therefore, it
is probably difficult to speak of the corporate opportunity doctrine as a cause
for financial structures; rather, we should consider it as a component of the law
that complements a particular set of economic institutions. In addition, a
particular set of legal doctrines may have an impact on what industries and
production structures will thrive in a jurisdiction. For example, while countries
following such a model (traditionally European civil law jurisdictions) are often
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quite successful at capital-intensive incremental product innovation, they
typically do not excel at small-scale startups (e.g. the IT industry). 274 The
impact of the corporate opportunities doctrine may influence the viability of
these industries in different degrees. We could hypothesize that, in an industry
where large scale capital investment is important, a corporate opportunity
doctrine that inhibits groups with large-scale shareholders might have higher
costs than benefits.
B. Enhanced Economic Attractiveness behind a Strong Protection of Corporate
Opportunities
We can hypothesize that there are economic reasons why a corporate
opportunities doctrine and the enforcement of the duty of loyalty, more
generally, have become more attractive in Germany and France. While,
generally, shared ownership structures in Continental Europe can still be
characterized as concentrated, there has been movement towards a more
dispersed ownership structure. As an important case in point, the fact that
German banks have famously divested some of their stakes in the late 1990s
and early 2000s has often been referenced. 275 In countries with significant state
ownership in large firms, there was a trend toward privatization during the
same period. Concurrently, institutional investors from overseas, such as
mutual funds and pension funds, have increased their stock ownership in
Continental Europe. It has been estimated that “US portfolio holdings of
foreign securities account for 13% of market capitalization of the German stock
market,” while they account for 12% in France. 276 Outside investors are thus
becoming an important constituency. One could argue that some Continental
European corporate governance systems are shifting from relational finance
toward outside finance. The shift is certainly not complete, but it does imply an
increase in the relative importance of outside investors. In comparison, the
significance of dealing with the corporation’s “main bank” may have declined,
as did the significance of group structures for which a strongly enforced
corporate opportunity doctrine constitutes a hindrance.

274. E.g., Hall & Soskice, supra note 272, at 36–44.
275. One reason was apparently the elimination of a capital gains tax for sales of shares between
corporations, which made it easier for financial institutions to reduce their stakes in industrial
companies. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive Pay,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 503 (2001); Dariusz Wójcik, Change in the German model of corporate
governance: evidence from blockholdings 1997-2001, 35 ENV’T & PLAN. 1431, 1435 (2003); DIGNAM &
GALANIS, supra note 25, at 291; JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER 159–62 (2010);
Wolf-Georg Ringe, Changing Law and Ownership Patterns in Germany: Corporate Governance and
the Erosion of Deutschland AG, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 518–19 (2015).
276. Markus Roth, Labor and Corporate Governance in Times of Pension Capitalism, 18
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 778 (2013).
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At the same time, this model helps us understand why corporate
opportunity waivers have become common in the U.S. in recent years. 277 While
the “re-concentration of share ownership” in U.S. firms that commentators have
observed 278 should not significantly impact corporate opportunities, the venture
capital industry frequently employs corporate opportunity waivers. 279 Venture
capital firms often invest in several businesses and take a controlling stake that
exposes them to the duty of loyalty. Consequently, they are more likely to run
afoul of the corporate opportunities doctrine, which, in this context, may turn
out to be a hindrance to business innovation.
While this may help explain why the political economy of Continental
European corporate law became more receptive to the corporate opportunities
doctrine, it does not explain why the U.S. approach has become more
influential than the U.K. approach in France and Germany. Moreover, the
German courts have not adopted some elements from the U.S. approach which
may have been a good fit to the German corporate governance system, such as
approval by the board or the defense of incapacity.
C. Why has the U.S. model been predominantly transplanted into Germany and
France?
In both Germany and France, the corporate opportunities doctrine has
developed under the umbrella of a “duty of loyalty,” while largely following an
ownership approach. In Germany, tests that closely match the U.S. corporate
opportunity doctrine have been adopted. 280 In France, the vocabulary of the
duty of loyalty merely introduces analyses centered on the reasonable
expectations of the corporation and how directors shall not divert from the
corporation opportunities that should benefit such corporation. 281 In France,
and even more so in Germany, court reasoning based on the duty of loyalty, in
the context of corporate opportunities, entails a cautious balancing of
interests—weighing the interests of the corporation against the legitimate
interests of the directors. While there is no obvious premium to US-origin
transplant in terms of cultural fit, 282 other factors can be suggested to explain
the hierarchy that benefit US-origin transplants over global competitors such as
Britain.
First, in the previous subsections we have speculated that in a relational
finance system, the benefits of the corporate opportunities doctrine are met by

277. Supra Section III.A.2.
278. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COL. L. REV. 863, 886–88 (2013).
279. Supra Section III.A.2.
280. See supra Section IV.A
281. See supra Section IV.B.
282. See supra Section V.B.
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greater social costs. Even if the two Continental European jurisdictions have
absorbed elements of an outside finance system, the cost of the stricter UK
approach toward corporate opportunities would have been greater than that of
the U.S. model during the transitional period.
Second, the judicial nature of the transplant represents the primary reason
that seems to account for the predominance of the U.S. approach over the U.K.
approach in that corporate opportunity law has been transplanted from the
Anglo-American tradition to France and Germany. Judges have been the main
actors in the adoption and development of corporate opportunities law in these
two countries. In the absence of legislative text, they have not engaged in
creative interpretation of a written source, but have rather developed, on the
basis of a general principle, the duty of loyalty and judgments aiming at a fair
and balanced solution, taking into account the interests of the corporation and
of the directors. In these jurisdictions, corporate opportunity law is shaped,
case-after-case. This organic development leaves judges with the flexibility to
design and clarify the applicable tests. 283 Such an approach is based on the use
of standards, as in the U.S. model. They give discretion for adjudicators to
determine, ex post, whether violations have occurred, and to mold corporate
decisions. 284
It is not surprising that adopting rules is not a very common strategy for
regulating complex, intra-corporate relations. Such matters can hardly be
regulated with a mere matrix of prohibitions and exemptions. In addition,
Continental judges are not in a particularly good position to design such a
matrix. Comparatively, U.K. judges are in a better position to create the law
and could rely on the extremely well-developed body of fiduciary law.
A third reason that may account for the prevalence of the U.S. approach is
the specific economic and political power of the U.S. and the signaling strategy
that it invites. U.S. economic power and U.S. economic and corporate law are
bedfellows. Their ambassadors include institutional investors, lawyers, business
executives, and multinational enterprises that are financed and advised by
American investment banks. Economic and political power influence legal
transfers. 285 Borrowing from U.S. corporate law can be expected to show
institutional investors that the host jurisdictions comply with the U.S. domestic
legal standards. 286 Though the corporate opportunities doctrine transplant has
been tolerated but not actively initiated by a legislature, 287 the economic

283. As has already been the case in Germany, see above Section IV.A.
284. See Armour et al., supra note 57, at 40.
285. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974).
286. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-François Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 164 (2003).
287. On this distinction and the importance of passively tolerated transplants in corporate law, see
Fleischer, supra note 197, at 388.
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importance of signaling a sound local investor protection has penetrated into
various levels of actors, so as to become the spirit of the age. Such Zeitgeist
inspires academics who introduce new foreign ideas into the debate, lawyers
who write briefs, and judges who, even in civil jurisdictions, are instrumental in
updating the law in practice.
A fourth reason that must be stressed is that, compared to English law, U.S.
corporate law is more attractive among the legal actors who are instrumental in
the actual corporate law transplant process. Explanations for this power include
the exemplary reputation of leading U.S. law schools among law firms and the
reputation for innovation in legal thinking fostered by a strong competition for
talented students. 288 There is a reasonable case for an academic ground
supporting the success of American legal transplant. Interdisciplinary
scholarship in areas such as corporate law and economics and law and finance
largely remains the hallmark of U.S. legal thinking. The legitimacy of U.S.
law—and therefore transplants originating from the U.S.— also rests in the
expert interdisciplinary scholarship that accompanies legal solutions. The
corporate opportunities doctrine has not been analyzed anywhere in as much
detail as it has been in U.S. academic literature. As a corollary, import of U.S.
law can also come through the import of economic or financial expertise, or the
sociology and anthropology of corporations. 289 Additionally, the influence
played by top European students who go to Columbia, Berkeley or Harvard for
an LL.M. and then return to their home country and develop a successful career
at the bar, on the bench, or as academics, should not be undermined. 290 These
former students act as agents between the continents. “The role of students
returning to their home countries after studying abroad has been of central
importance ever since the invention of universities.” 291 The role of Middle
Ages scholars, educated in Bologna or the Sorbonne, who contributed to the
circulation of Roman law in Germany is historical evidence of this
importance. 292
PART VI: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONVERGENCE AND TRANSPLANT DEBATES
In this part, we discuss larger implications of our investigation for corporate
governance in comparative law debates. In part, these points overlap, but they

288. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Import and Export of Law and Legal Institutions:
International Strategies in National Palace Wars, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 241, 250–51 (David
Nelken & Johannes Fees eds., 2001).
289. Id. at 251.
290. However, it appears that common law countries are overrepresented in top US LL.M.
programs. See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants–Legal Families and the Diffusion of
(Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1849–51 (2009).
291. David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 7,
24 (David Nelken & Johannes Fees eds., 2001).
292. Fleischer, supra note 197, at 391.

149

3 - GELTER (DO NOT DELETE)

Berkeley Business Law Journal

5/25/2018 8:54 PM

Vol. 15:1, 2018

are relevant for different audiences. While convergence is primarily of interest
to corporate law scholars, the debate about legal transplants is mainly a concern
for comparativists. First, we suggest that convergence in corporate governance
may sometimes be driven by changes in legal doctrine—a mechanism that has
so far received little attention in the literature (section A). Second, we suggest
that scholars of comparative law need to broaden their perspective in their
understanding of legal transplants, and recognize that general concepts are
easily transplantable because they are adaptable (section B).
A. Convergence of legal doctrines
Convergence in corporate governance is usually identified on the level of
corporate governance practices or on the level of legislation, with the examples
given in the literature typically falling into these two categories. For example,
Hansmann and Kraakman look at convergence of corporate governance
practices on the one hand, 293 and legal convergence on the other. 294 The
literature typically focuses on examples that require some form of legislative
action, (including disclosure requirements, board structure, shareholder
litigation or the spread of the UK model of takeover law), 295 or corporate
governance codes and reports. 296 Other authors have emphasized mechanisms
requiring conscious firm choice, in particular to avoid inefficient laws. 297
Mathias Siems, in his comprehensive study of convergence in corporate law
relating to the position of shareholders, emphasizes the primacy of statutory
law over case law for convergence, noting that “[i]n an area like company law,
structural problems cannot be tackled, nor legal certainty adequately ensured,
through case law alone.” Siems also points out that statutes can be transplanted
more easily. 298
Our case study highlights an alternative pathway toward convergence,
namely, legal doctrine embedded in the case law. The possibility of legal
doctrines as a vehicle for convergence has been considered in the literature, but

293. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 454–55; see also Eddy Wymeersch, Convergence
or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REGIMES 230, 240–41 (2003) (discussing ownership structure); Steen Thomsen, The Convergence of
Corporate Governance Systems to European and Anglo-American Standards, 4 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
31, 38–44 (2003) (discussing convergence with respect to independent directors and corporate ownership
structures).
294. Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. at 455–58.
295. Id.; Wymeersch, supra note 274, at 237–38.
296. E.g., id. at 236–37; SIEMS, supra note 269, at 56–59.
297. See Gilson, supra note 15, at 346–56 (discussing convergence through contract and hybrid
convergence through regulatory competition).
298. SIEMS, supra note 269, at 244–45.
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it has rarely been studied on the micro-level. 299 Our analysis leads us to several
observations for the convergence debate. First, the target jurisdictions we
studied, France and Germany, are usually considered quintessential civil law
jurisdictions. An observer from the common law world might be impressed by
the stereotype about case law not being significant in civil law jurisdictions due
to the absence of a formal rule of stare decisis. The example of corporate
opportunities clearly illustrates that case law can be a component of
convergence if courts absorb foreign doctrinal models and incorporate them
into their own reasoning.
Second, our study sheds light on formal and functional convergence and the
relationship between the two. Both France and Germany provide examples of
doctrinal convergence on the level of legal doctrine. However, the pathway in
each case is very different. In Germany, we see gradually developing functional
convergence in the law that precipitated formal convergence on the level of
doctrine. In France, we can see only subtle functional convergence so far,
although formal convergence may actually follow. The catalyst for formal
convergence in Germany was legal scholarship. Whether doctrinal convergence
will remain purely functional or also take a formal shape will depend on how
legal reasoning, generally, occurs in a particular jurisdiction. For the German
case in point, there were two prerequisites, namely, (1) the strong influence of
legal scholarship on legal doctrine in German, and (2) the receptivity of
German scholars to comparison. In France, where scholarship tends to exercise
less overt influence on the courts, we may not expect to see formal
convergence.
Third, we can observe a continued divergence between U.S. and U.K.
corporate opportunities law, in spite of the shared adherence to the common
law tradition. At least in the U.K., policymakers and scholars are generally
receptive to considering U.S. influence, and, in practice, the U.K. came close to
adopting the U.S. model when the Companies Act of 2006 was being prepared.
However, it was ultimately rejected, in large part, because a domestic doctrinal
framework was already in place. This example shows that doctrinal path
dependence may inhibit convergence in legal doctrine.
B. The nature and mechanism of transplants
Our analysis of corporate opportunities also allows us to draw some general
lessons for the theory of legal transplants. First, we have shown that, even
today, legal transplants are not necessarily legislative in nature, but can, rather,
be general concepts (e.g., fiduciary duties), legal doctrine (e.g., corporate

299. See David Cabrelli & Mathias M. Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins, and Transplants in
Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analysis, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 138
(2015) (including case law as a source of law in their quantitative comparative study).
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opportunity doctrine), and even their subparts (e.g., “tests” for corporate
opportunities used in the US). Transplantation through case law may, at first
glance, appear to be limited; especially since legislatures tend to have more
extensive law-making powers than courts. However, case law transplants are
often determinative of changes in legal reasoning, which are gradually
absorbed by the judges and other actors within the legal system. They may,
therefore, precipitate larger cultural changes that ultimately result in a
fundamental transformation of the legal system; which, eventually might chip
away at the familiar “transplant effect.” Scholars should, therefore, reconsider
the traditional, pessimistic view that “the Anglo-American concept of fiduciary
duty may not be easily transplantable (. . .) to civil law systems.” 300 On the
contrary, the flexible nature of general principles, such as fiduciary duties,
increases their potential to be incrementally adopted and successfully adapted
into the host jurisdiction. 301
Second, transplants can be merely formal or substantial, but their effect is
always the result of an interaction with the local legal culture. A transplant may
be applied fully or only partially. More precisely, the way the transplant
occurs—the canals through which imports are made—matter, and impact how
the transplant operates. In our example, we have observed two different
transplant routes. One is more theoretical and relies primarily on the dialog of
scholars (German model). In this case, the medium for the transplant was
scholarship, and the precise impact is determined by whether scholars are
receptive to foreign influence or not. As we have seen, the receptivity of
German scholars has led to an overt parallelism with U.S. doctrinal structures.
The other mode of transplantation is more practical and relies primarily on the
dialogue of judges, as seen in the French model. Institutionalized exchanges,
such as those between supreme courts judges, have facilitated the process. A
dialogue between scholars and judges also exists, but it is more domestic. If
judges are constrained in their ability to overtly adopt foreign doctrinal
structures, they may limit themselves to a functional adoption of a foreign
doctrine. If judges adopt a doctrine because of a deeply felt need to transition to
a particular model, the adoption may be more profound and functional, even if
the existence of a legal transplant is less visible on the surface.
PART VII: CONCLUSION
How to handle corporate opportunities, and in particular the interest of a
director in such opportunity, has been a difficult question in the U.K. and the

300. Katharina Pistor, Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions:
Lessons from the Incomplete Law Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE
LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS BORDER DEALS 77, 99 (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2003).
301. Fleischer, supra note 197, at 393.
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U.S. for a long time. Though it is a relatively new question in Germany and
France, it has been similarly identified as a difficult one. Our study has shown a
considerable degree of convergence: the corporate opportunities doctrine has
radiated from U.S. law to these two countries. It is an illustration of the
Americanization of the law that scholars have frequently emphasized. 302 The
U.K., which has the oldest corporate opportunity doctrine, has largely retained
its own tradition. While we cannot generalize to other Continental European
civil law jurisdictions, the no-conflict approach has not been received in the
two jurisdictions we have investigated as a structuring principle. The economic
macro-fit of the corporate opportunity doctrine may have improved in recent
decades, in light of changes in these corporate governance systems. Hence, the
jurisdictions we examined became more receptive to the doctrine, specifically
its U.S. version, which, apparently, provided a better fit than the U.K.
equivalent. However, the two jurisdictions differ in significant ways from each
other, as each of them has absorbed the doctrine in its own fashion. On this
matter, the dividing line is still between the two common law countries and the
two civil law countries. This finding underlines the complexity of the legal
geography. Legal traditions are not blocks that oppose each other but streams
able to merge, influence one another, and potentially deviate along the various
dimensions of a given issue.

302. L’américanisation du droit, Arch. Phil. Droit 45 (2001); JENS DROLSHAMMER, A TIMELY
TURN TO THE LAWYER? GLOBALISIERUNG UND DIE ANGLO-AMERIKANISIERUNG VON RECHT UND
RECHTSBERUFEN – ESSAYS 77–96 (2009).
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